The effects of storytelling and pretend play on cognitive processes, short-term and long-term narrative recall. by Kim, Sook-Yi
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 
1-1-1996 
The effects of storytelling and pretend play on cognitive 
processes, short-term and long-term narrative recall. 
Sook-Yi Kim 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 
Recommended Citation 
Kim, Sook-Yi, "The effects of storytelling and pretend play on cognitive processes, short-term and long-
term narrative recall." (1996). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 5243. 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/5243 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 

THE EFFECTS OF STORYTELLING AND PRETEND PLAY 
ON COGNITIVE PROCESSES, SHORT-TERM AND 
LONG-TERM NARRATIVE RECALL 
A Dissertation Presented 
by 
SOOK-YI KIM 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION 
May 1996 
School of Education 
® Copyright by Sook-Yi Kim 1996 
All Rights Reserved 
THE EFFECTS OF STORYTELLING AND PRETEND PLAY 
ON COGNITIVE PROCESSES, SHORT-TERM 
AND LONG-TERM NARRATIVE 
RECALL 
A Dissertation Presented 
by 
SOOK-YI KIM 
Approved as to style and content by: 
This study is dedicated 
to my parents and to all Korean 
educators who teach children and have 
themselves contributed to the study of 
early childhood education using the 
discovery approach and progressive pedagogy. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
My appreciation is extended to my parents who have 
supported me in various different ways; economically, 
educationally, and spiritually. Also, Jesus Christ was my 
greatest teacher during my study. He knew the way that I 
took and when he has tested me, I came forth as gold. I 
press on toward the goal to win the prize for which God 
has called me heavenward in Jesus Christ. 
I am also thankful to the children with whom I have 
had the privilege of meeting at the preschool of Smith and 
Hampshire-Franklin. The big sisters, runaway babies, 
spaceships, rivers, and dams were a source of inspiration 
both in understanding child development and the children 
themselves. Foremost, however, they provided an ongoing 
opportunity to vicariously enjoy the pleasure of 
storytelling and pretense. 
I would like to acknowledge the guidance and 
encouragement of professors Ernest D. Washington, Grace J. 
Craig, and Brenda A. Allen. 
v 
ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF STORYTELLING AND PRETEND PLAY ON 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES, SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM 
NARRATIVE RECALL 
MAY 1996 
SOOK-YI KIM, B.A., OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY 
M.ED., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
ED.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Ernest D. Washington 
This study explored and demonstrated the effects of 
storytelling and pretend play on short-term and long-term 
narrative recall. Specifically, this study examined and 
identified the cognitive changes which underlay children's 
actions during pretense enactment and narration. 
Educators and researchers propose that play and story¬ 
telling emerge at the same time in a "stream of 
symbolization" as preschool and kindergarten children 
learn basic skills relevant to the narrative as a 
cognitive model of an event. 
Pretend play has long been considered an important 
area in the development of the child's growing cognitive 
and social competence. This study focused on the 
developmental differences between storytelling and pretend 
play, short-term and long-term memory, encoding and 
inferences and their interrelationships. 
According to the data, there were significant 
differences between storytelling and pretend play in 
vi 
facilitating narrative recall. The data also indicated 
that the ability to encode exceeded the ability to make 
inferences. The children were able to engage in 
storytelling and pretend play while at the same time they 
did not improve in their abilities to make inferences. 
This indicates that inferences required more complex 
cognitive skills, and were not related to the improvement 
of storytelling and pretend play. There was not a 
significant difference overall between the short- and 
long-term conditions. However, this study supports the 
hypothesis that storytelling and pretend play affects 
cognitive variables. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
Story narratives and pretend play have provided valid 
and reliable ways to measure children's feelings, and 
pretend scenarios reflect children's knowledge of real- 
life events, their concerns and their attempts to organize 
and make sense of their experiences (Farver and Frosch, 
1996). 
Pretend play has received considerable attention as a 
context for cognitive and social development. Piaget 
(1962) viewed play as indicating mastery of the concept 
that one thing can represent another, a representational 
skill requisite to the development of preoperational 
thought. However, he viewed symbolic play as purely 
assimilative, in the service of the preschool child's need 
for a sense of mastery over the environment, and did not 
accord such play a facilitative role in the development of 
cognitive skills (Doyle and Doehring, 1991). 
Social pretend play is a favored activity of 
preschool children (Connolly, 1988) . Educators and 
psychologists have argued that it is also important for 
children's intellectual and psychosocial growth. This 
belief is reflected in the curriculum of many early child¬ 
hood education programs which are organized to provide 
opportunities for fantasy play activities (Curry and 
1 
Arnaud, 1984). It is also central to the interests of 
many researchers who have examined the specific contribu¬ 
tions of pretend play to learning and development in early 
childhood (Fein, 1981). Empirical research generally 
supports the claim that social pretend play is associated 
with psychosocial maturity, peer popularity and teacher¬ 
rated peer social competence (Connolly and Doyle, 1984). 
Current explanations for these findings emphasize the 
unique features of the pretend mode which are thought to 
facilitate children's social interactions. By definition, 
the pretend mode entails the nonliteral treatment of 
objects or the self (Garvey, 1977). It has been further 
characterized by a particular cluster of behaviors. 
Smilansky (1968) emphasized the qualities of persistence 
and reciprocity in the child's behavior. Garvey (1977) 
has stressed the role of effectiveness in social 
communication in pretend play. 
To participate in human culture, children must be 
familiar with several narrative forms. One of the most 
complex may be the invented story. To understand or 
create invented stories, children must learn to understand 
the roles characters may play, the way they think and 
feel, and what motivates them to act. They must also 
understand and create plots, the organizing dynamic around 
which the actions of a story are built (Brooks, 1985). 
Developmentalists want to know, among other things, at 
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what age children can construct competent (plotted) 
stories, and under what circumstances (Benson, 1993). 
Play is a vehicle children have available to them for 
imagining roles and the thoughts and feelings that go with 
them, as well as the setting in which they are performed. 
Thus play may be a means of learning skills that can be 
used in inventing stories. On the other hand, children 
can also directly invent stories with characters and 
situations. 
Researchers at Project Zero, at Harvard University, 
argue that play and storytelling emerge at the same time, 
as a 'stream of symbolization,' and have used replica play 
situations to study how preschool children learn basic 
skills relevant to narrative (Gardner and Wolf, 1982). 
They find that by the time they are four, children engaged 
in pretend play with replica toys can handle the actions 
of two or more characters, the interrelationships among 
them (Rubin and Wolf, 1979), and make attributions about 
their internal states (Wolf, Rygh and Altshuler, 1984). 
The present study was designed to assess the 
facilitative effects of pretend play and storytelling on 
memory for detail. It was proposed that the demands of 
these two tasks for narrative structure will facilitate 
both the encoding of details and the ability to make 
inferences. 
Several recent studies suggest that retelling 
significantly improves kindergarten children's story 
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comprehension, sense of story structure, and oral-language 
complexity when used as a follow-up to listening to 
stories (Morrow, 1984; 1985; 1986). Only a few studies, 
however, have been reported that investigate retelling as 
an instructional strategy for enhancing reading 
comprehension. 
Children's story production abilities undergo 
developments similar to retelling abilities. Making-up 
and telling an original story is somewhat more complex 
than retelling a remembered story, however. At the very 
least, new information is presented while the story is 
being told, and the information must be casually related 
to be comprehensible to the listener. 
The structure of young children's original stories 
changes across early elementary school. Stein and her 
colleagues (Stein, 1988; Stein and Kilgore, 1988) have 
found evidence that young children have a much broader 
story concept that older children and that preschool 
children include information from fewer story categories 
than older children. Salgo (1988) found both qualitative 
and quantitative differences between preschoolers and 
kindergarten children in terms of causal connectivity in 
story production. In Shapiro and Hudson's (1991) study, 
Grade 1 children produced structurally more complex 
picture-elicited stories than did preschoolers, even 
though their stories were of the same length. Trabasso 
and his colleagues (Trabasso and Nickels, 1992) described 
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a sequence of development in children's ability to produce 
causally related goal plans in picture-elicited stories: 
Descriptions of depicted states and actions were typical 
for three and four-year old children; causally related 
goal plans were produced by some five-year olds; and 
complex, hierarchical goal plans predominated in the 
narratives of older children. 
Although these studies have documented remarkable 
developments in story memory and story production, none 
have isolated the cognitive factors that might influence 
the development of these abilities. Piaget (1960) argued 
that children's causal and logical thinking does not 
develop until between five and eight years of age. This 
is supported by the literature on the development of story 
memory and story production: Children become capable of 
comprehending and using the informational and causal 
structure in stories around the time that they begin 
formal schooling. It is therefore reasonable to 
investigate the influences of age-related and schooling- 
related experiences on the young child's ability to 
remember and create stories according to their causal and 
informational structure. 
The present study used procedures to measure 
cognitive processes as defined and developed by Allen 
(1996), that is (1) encoding or the cognitive processes 
used to define the bits of information presented in a 
situation and to access our knowledge of relevant problems 
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such as identifying the terms in a verbal analogy or 
recalling the main characters in a story; and (2) 
inferring or the cognitive processes employed to show one 
or more relationships between objects or events (i.e., how 
term "A" relates to character "B" in a story). 
This study examined several elements of significance. 
First, storytelling and pretend play include encoding and 
inferences that underlie the narrative structures. 
Encoding and inferences are very different in terms of 
their cognitive complexity, and the first is easier for 
young children to learn than the second. Secondly, 
narrative structures persist over time, and this study is 
concerned with discerning whether short-term and long-term 
memory are differentially influenced by the form of 
narrative structure. Thus, storytelling and pretend play 
behavior was seen as an important indicator of the level 
of symbolic functioning and a reflection of increasing 
cognitive maturity of the child. 
Purposes of the Study and Research Questions 
This study focused on the measurement and development 
of narrative structure and pretend play in preschool and 
kindergarten classrooms in a semi-rural Massachusetts 
community. There are general agreements in child 
development that pretend play and storytelling are 
critical to social cognitive development. The primary 
research questions guiding this study were the following: 
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1. Are there significant differences between 
storytelling and pretend play in the facilitation of 
short-term and long-term recall of narrative structure? 
2. Are there significant differences in the 
influence of children's short-term and long-term memory 
upon narrative structure and memory questions? 
3. Are there significant differences between 
encoding and inference upon storytelling and pretend play 
with narrative recall? 
4. Do storytelling and pretend play influence the 
answering of questions in narrative recall? 
One major purpose of the study was to measure the 
effects of pretense and story comprehension upon narrative 
structure. Thus, this study examined the effects of 
pretend play and storytelling upon narrative recall. 
Pretend play has long been recognized as central to the 
cognitive development of children. This study also 
explored narrative structure and information processing as 
cognitive processes that were influenced by play. The 
assessment of narrative structure revealed the overall 
grasp that children had of the schemata of a story. At 
the same time the cognitive content of the story analyzed 
by examining the child's ability to encode and draw 
inferences from what they have learned. The linking of 
the narration, encoding and inference making showed the 
complexities of the cognitive skills that children 
routinely used in pretend play. 
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Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited in several ways. This research 
employs primarily a study of white Americans in a kinder¬ 
garten and a preschool. There is limited ethnic, 
religious, and economic diversity in the sample. Many of 
the narrations and enactments in the play were designed to 
stimulate the experience of children's memory. There was 
also a strong focus on role playing, storytelling, and 
narrative activities that promoted the understanding of 
the feelings of those who were developmentally different 
from them. 
Another inherent limitation in this study was the 
size of the sample. A larger sample size would have 
strengthened the findings, and the data analysis could 
have used advanced statistical methods more effectively. 
An increase in the number of children would have provided 
separate age groups, i.e., a four and five-year-old group 
instead of a younger and an older group ranging from four 
to five years. A quantitative study approach has been 
chosen for this study in an effort to understand the 
complexities of children's narration and behavior. Thus, 
this study traded off the predictive nature of the 
findings of a research design for a less detailed account 
of a complex phenomenon. 
Additionally, there is a problem in the precision of 
the study instrument. The reliability and validity of the 
research instruments were not firmly established prior to 
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implementation of the study. However, the researcher 
sought to reduce this limitation by both scrupulous 
examination of reactions and interpretations of the 
results throughout the research, as well as through the 
use of quantitative methodology such as precise 
measurements and tests of hypotheses. 
The present study is intended to stimulate and to 
challenge further research on children's storytelling and 
pretend play with empirical, theoretical, and 
methodological concepts. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Story Comprehension and Representation 
Stories with their narration are an important factor 
of early childhood education. Children love listening to 
old stories, telling stories, and sharing stories about 
real and imagine events. Children learn about the world 
of literature from their experiences with stories. 
"Children learn that stories have certain formal openings 
(Once upon a time), and closings (and they lived happily 
ever after.), and that stories have characters which 
behave in predictable patterns of events that related to 
story structure" (Muth, 1989). 
Reading stories to children has long been recognized 
as beneficial by both educators and the public. Teachers 
acknowledge the importance of classroom story times, and 
generations of parents have read stories to children as 
part of a bedtime ritual. Such popular practices and 
general perceptions have been reinforced by theoretical, 
correlational, case studies, and anecdotal reports that 
identify relationships between reading stories to children 
and specific aspects of their literacy development. 
The relationship between reading to children and 
literacy development has been well documented. Studies 
have found that early readers (including children who 
learned to read before they entered school) and successful 
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readers tend to have been read to frequently at home 
(Clark, 1984). Children's language development, speci¬ 
fically growth in syntactic complexity and vocabulary, is 
associated with early read-aloud experiences (Burroughs, 
1972) . 
Recent research has shown why reading stories to 
children is so important. Experimental research in school 
settings has tried to determine the types of activity that 
enhance literacy skills through storybook readings. Some 
of these studies have involved children in different forms 
of active participation after the storybook reading. 
Others have focused on the influence of the teacher when 
reading to a whole class and have found that the teacher's 
reading style affects children's comprehension of stories 
(Dunning and Mason, 1984). 
We are in the early stages of learning more precisely 
how story reading helps to develop literacy, but important 
practices already have been identified. Simply reading to 
children does not necessarily bring positive results. 
What happens before, during, and after the reading; how 
the child participates in the event; and the style in 
which the story is read, all play important roles in 
children's literacy development. 
Children's interaction with adults in book reading 
experiences influences the development of comprehension, 
oral language, and sense of story structure. Brown's 
research (1976) suggests that the active involvement of 
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children in story reconstruction facilitates comprehension 
of the story. Reconstruction was defined in Brown's study 
as thinking about individual story events and arranging 
pictures of the story in sequence. By mentally 
reconstructing events and arranging pictures, children 
built an internal representation of the story. 
Repetitive stories are important as an instructional 
method because children recall complex story structure. 
Children are introduced to repetition, recall stories, 
demonstrate how repeated events and words are used in the 
stories and then express their stories. In retelling 
stories, it is possible to use pictures, puppets and 
storylines so that children can create their stories by 
drawing or using pictures. 
Pellegrini and Galda (1982) found that children's 
story comprehension and retelling ability improved with 
their active involvement and peer interaction in story 
reconstruction through role playing. Similarly, Amato and 
Ziegler (1973) found that retelling enables the child to 
play a large and active role in reconstructing stories and 
provides for interaction between the teller and the 
listener. 
Story retelling has the potential for skill develop¬ 
ment. However, it has not been widely tested as an 
instructional technique. There have been studies of 
children's participation in strategies with 
12 
characteristics similar to those of story retelling. 
Blank and Sheldon (1971) reported that both semantic 
recall and syntactic complexity in the language of four to 
six year olds were improved when subjects were asked to 
repeat sentences in a story during a story reading. 
Zimiles and Kuhns (1976) found that retelling improved 
story comprehension in six to eight year olds who were 
asked to retell a story after it was read to them. Post¬ 
tests indicated that retelling stories shortly after 
listening to them facilitated recall. 
Morrow (1984; 1985; 1986) carried out three different 
studies with kindergarten children to determine the 
specific instructional benefits of story retelling. 
Children in experimental groups retold stories after 
listening to them. Over eight weekly sessions, guidance 
in retelling was offered when children needed assistance. 
Significant improvement was found for the experimental 
groups in oral language complexity, comprehension of 
story, sense of story structure during retelling, and 
inclusion of structural elements in dictations of original 
stories generated by the youngsters. Children who were 
considered to be low achievers also made significant gains 
in the areas tested. 
Engaging children in retelling a story reflects a 
holistic concept of reading comprehension. Retelling 
requires the reader or listener to integrate information 
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by relating parts of the story to one another and to 
personalize information by relating it to one's own back¬ 
ground and experience. As an activity, it contrasts with 
the piecemeal approach of traditional teacher posed 
questions which require students to respond with specific 
bits of information about the text (Morrow, et al., 1986). 
Comprehension of a story involves building a coherent 
representation, or situation model of story information. 
Some of the processes involved in building a coherent 
representation have emerged in research (Ackerman and 
Silver, 1991). One process of particular importance 
involves laying the foundation of a representation from 
early sentences and ideas in a story (cf. Gernsbacker, 
1991). Subsequent information is linked onto this 
foundation. Salience or prominence of particular 
characters and concepts in a story representation is 
important. Prominence reflects the thematic importance of 
a concept for a story and the degree to which a represen¬ 
tation is organized around the concept. Concept 
prominence may affect processing by maintaining concept 
activation across short intervals in which a concept is 
not mentioned and across minor topic shifts. 
These ideas suggest that developmental differences in 
the processing of initial information in stories could 
contribute to differences in making causal inferences 
later in or after a story. 
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Developmental researchers have examined this issue. 
For example, Nezworski, Stein, and Trabasso (1982) 
examined children's structural representations of stories 
in the form of story grammars, and Trabasso, Secco, and 
Van den Broek (1989) probed children's sensitivity to the 
causal connectedness of story events to other events. 
This research, however, did not describe the processes 
involved in building story representations nor how initial 
processes affect concept use. As a result, we know little 
about the concepts that are used in inferences, the 
constraints on concept use, or if the constraints differ 
developmentally. 
The specification of the causal dependencies in a 
text is the result of an inferential process in which the 
reader ties each event or fact to prior text or to 
relevant background knowledge (Van den Broek, 1990a). One 
type of inference involves the connections between an 
event or fact and the preceding or still attended text. A 
second type is a connection between a text and textual 
information that is removed from the surface structure of 
the text. Together, these two types of inferences allow 
the reader to recognize local as well as distant causal 
connections in a text. 
Comprehension of a story appears to result in 
multiple mental representations. One of these is a 
representation of the context, that is, a representation 
of its words and sentences. Another may be a mental model 
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of what the context is about (Glenberg and Langston, 
1992). The representational elements of the mental model 
stand for such things as ideas, objects, events and 
processes. It can be updated and manipulated and can 
serve to foreground significant aspects of a situation. 
In producing the mental model, various kinds of relation¬ 
ships may be inferred but causal dependencies have been 
found to be particularly significant in the process. 
Comprehension of narratives is assumed to be based 
upon the ability to detect a character's goals, themes and 
plans. These inferences allow the interpretation of a 
sequence of actions according to a goal plan. To 
comprehend as well as produce goal plans, one has to be 
able to form a mental representation of the events in 
which one anticipates possible problems and solutions, and 
monitors whether the actions follow the plan and result in 
successful problem resolution (Scholnick and Friedman, 
1987). Storytelling or narrating can also be understood 
as communicative acts that follow certain narrative 
conventions, namely, that one should organize the telling 
of events according to the rules of intentional actions 
and causal-temporal sequencing. 
Analyzing Narratives and Metacognition 
In a recent study of preschoolers' narratives, 
Nicolopoulou (1990) argues that children's narratives are 
meaningful texts that reveal how they view the world. In 
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constructing narratives, children incorporate individual 
experiences and social relationships, social interactions, 
and current situations into culturally available images 
and cognitive frameworks. At the same time, narratives 
provide children with a means to express and symbolically 
resolve emotionally important themes that preoccupy them 
(Nicolopoulou, 1993) . 
Studies on children's narratives have found gender 
differences in the content and construction of narratives. 
Overall, boys' narratives included superheroes, aggressive 
and violent behavior and attempts to master situations 
with aggression. In contrast, girls' narratives were 
typically concerned with families, friends, and caretakers 
(Farver and Frosch, 1996). In terms of narrative 
structure, girls' stories showed a trend toward order, 
while boys' stories were more inclined toward disorder 
(Nicolopoulou and Scales, 1990). 
There is extensive theoretical literature on the 
importance of narrative as a fundamental means for 
representing and making sense of life (e.g., Bruner, 
1986). Interpreted as "a meta-code, a human universal on 
the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature 
of a shared reality can be transmitted" (White, 1980, p. 
6), narrative has become an anthropological descriptor of 
human existence. Humans are construed as Homo narrans and 
not simply as Homo symbolicus or Homo sapiens (Fisher, 
1984; 1985) . Human beings make sense of the world. 
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individually and collectively, by representing experience 
in narrative form. In other words, life history attains 
sense in and through acts of narration. 
A three-dimensional model of narrative structure 
(Russell and Van den Broek, 1992) emphasizes (a) the 
structural connectedness of narratives, (b) the represen¬ 
tation of subjectivity (i.e., the motivational and 
psychological relation that subjects assume toward the 
events being talked about) in narratives, and (c) the 
elaboration/complexity of narratives. These three 
dimensions of narrative structure have received extensive 
empirical and/or theoretical investigation. They also can 
provide important clinical information about the client's 
phenomenal experience. 
Cognitive and developmental studies have repeatedly 
demonstrated that the structural properties of a series of 
events are central to its mental representation (Abelson, 
1981). Two main classes of structural variables have 
received intense investigation: (a) abstract event 
categories (e.g., setting, initiating event, internal 
responses, attempt, consequence, and reaction) that are 
instantiated in the concrete statements that together 
comprise the content of the narrative (e.g., Mandler and 
Johnson, 1977), and (b) abstract sets of relations (e.g., 
temporal and causal) that exist between the events that 
instantiate that abstract categories (Kintsch and van 
Dijk, 1978). 
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Narratives with many causal relations between their 
constituent events are better recalled than those with 
fewer such relations. Similarly, individual events within 
a narrative that have many causal connections are better 
recalled, more often summarized, and judged more important 
than events with few causal connections (Trabasso, Secco, 
and Van den Broek, 1989). Three-year-old children can 
recognize causal relations between events that occur close 
together in space and time; however, the ability to 
causally relate events that happen over several days or 
occur as events in separate episodes develops over the 
elementary school years (Van den Broek and Thurlow, 1991). 
For preschoolers and second graders, story recall and 
reconstruction are enhanced when stories strictly conform 
to temporal order, although this effect is less pronounced 
for older children and adults. Younger children do 
equally poorly on the recall and reconstruction of stories 
if the stories are made sufficiently complex (Brown, 
1976). These findings point to the importance of the 
abstract event categories and the relations between them 
in the cognitive representation of events. 
Metacognitive awareness is another important aspect 
of skilled comprehension. Metacognition is a general term 
referring to the ways in which people use their knowledge 
about mental processes to monitor and possibly to alter 
their performance. If we believe that text recall is 
better if we remember the gist, rather than the verbatim 
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form of the text, we will not try to memorize every word 
in the text. Poor comprehenders may demonstrate less 
metacognitive awareness than good comprehenders. This 
conclusion seems likely given that metacognitive skills 
such as comprehension monitoring make demands on working 
memory. Brown (1980) lists several metacognitive 
processes in skilled readers: clarifying the purposes of 
reading, identifying important aspects of the message, 
allocating attention to relevant information, monitoring 
their comprehension of the message, reviewing and self- 
testing, taking corrective measures when needed, and 
recovering from disruptions and distraction. 
Pretend Play in Childhood: An Overview 
Research on children's pretend play has broadened 
significantly in the past decade. One reason for the 
increasing interest has been that pretend play is assumed 
to reflect an emerging representational ability and thus 
provides valuable information about the child's cognitive 
and social development (Lyytinen, 1989). Piaget (1962) 
inspired this research and viewed the onset of symbolic 
play, together with language and deferred imitation, as 
simultaneous manifestations of semiotic functions. 
In one of his major works on infancy, Piaget (1962) 
argued that pretend play is an extreme form of assimila¬ 
tion. A present object that is only vaguely comparable to 
an absent one can evoke a mental image of it and be 
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assimilated to it, resulting in the creation of a symbol. 
The ability to pretend depends on this capacity to 
represent absent objects and situations. This capacity is 
said to emerge during the second year of life. 
For Piaget, early pretense symbolizing develops in a 
hierarchical fashion from familiar self-directed actions 
performed out of context, through the symbolic identifica¬ 
tion of one object with another, to increasingly complex 
symbolic combinations (Piaget, 1962). This account has 
been elaborated by McCune-Nicolich (1981), who suggested 
that late in the second year a fundamental shift in the 
child's symbolic play "allows games to be generated 
mentally," which requires "the coordination of at least 
two representational structures" (p. 787). 
The notion that play behavior changes between birth 
and school age is not new. But the developmental account 
offered by Piaget (1962) provided a way of segmenting play 
behavior that implied a sequentially ordered pattern of 
change. First, in the Piagetian scheme, play is divided 
into three general forms: sensorimotor practice, 
pretense, and games with rules. These forms appear in an 
ordered sequence during the first six or seven years of 
life. Second, pretense develops through a sequence of 
stages and phases into increasingly sophisticated forms. 
A baby needs to grasp both object meanings and skills 
in social interaction in order to pretend. When the child 
begins to notice and remember the differences between 
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objects and their uses, object meanings begin to develop. 
At the very earliest stages in this kind of learning, 
children's knowledge is quite simple - hard objects are 
good for banging; soft things are good for rubbing and 
patting. As soon as a young child can trade turns back 
and forth with a partner, she has at least a simple 
understanding of social interactions. 
Pretense is a theoretical construct defined as 
behavior in a simulative, nonliteral, or "as if" mode. A 
variety of terms such as imaginative play, make-believe 
play, fantasy play, and dramatic play have been used to 
refer to this type of play behavior. Although these terms 
may reflect slightly different judgments of either its 
value or focus, they tend to be used interchangeably. 
According to Fein (1981), interest in pretend play is 
currently in its third revival. In the first wave 
spanning the 1920s and early 1930s, the topic was deemed 
important enough to include in scholarly works on 
childhood and in child-care manuals for parents. It 
relied for sustenance largely on baby diaries, anecdotal 
accounts, or clinical descriptions. But remarkably little 
of the empirical research of this period, even when 
concerned with play, addressed itself specifically to 
pretense. 
The second wave of interest was in the late 1940s and 
1950s. This interest reflected the attempt of 
behaviorally oriented personality theorists to translate 
22 
the assumptions of psychoanalytic theory and play therapy 
into an empirical, rigorous study of personality formation 
in young children. In the doll play research of the 
period, pretend play was viewed as a projective test 
through which a sensitive observer might understand the 
"important experiences" of the child. Play became a tool 
for studying sibling rivalry, aggression, family roles, 
and other phenomena. It became clear that doll play 
performance was influenced by a host of situational 
factors (e.g., experimenter-child interaction, duration of 
the session, realism, or organization of the materials). 
It was assumed that the content of pretend play, 
especially its negative emotional content, reflected 
children's real experiences. However, it soon became 
clear that the relationship between play content and real 
experience was far from simple. 
A third wave of interest in pretend play emerged in 
the early 1970s, influenced in large measure by the work 
of Piaget (1962). Piaget's work became the basis of 
research of pretend play, especially during the second 
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year of life. The volume edited by Herron and Sutton- 
Smith (1971) displayed the theoretical richness of the 
study of play, and Singer (1973) demonstrated the 
usefulness of conceptualizing play as a dimension of 
personality. The current revival differs from previous 
ones in the age range of children studied, in its 
structural orientation, and in its attention to variables 
reflecting the quality of play rather than its specific 
affective or thematic content. 
Piaget proposed that changes in the occurrence of 
pretend play follow something like an inverted U-shaped 
curve. Pretend activities begin to emerge during the 
second year of life, increase over the following three or 
four years, and then decline. According to Piaget, play 
becomes more realistic as thought becomes more logical. 
Piaget thus predicted a rise and fall in pretend play 
roughly between the years of one and six. In addition, 
the onset of pretend play is accompanied by a decline in 
sensorimotor play, and its offset by the appearance of 
games with rules. The Piagetian scheme thereby implies 
that in stable environments less mature forms are deleted 
as more mature forms are added. 
As many studies have shown, during the toddler period 
pretend play becomes more frequent and increasingly social 
(Bretherton, 1984). Initially, children's early symbolic 
representation is seen in behavior directed to the self 
and involves familiar rituals from everyday life. At 
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twelve months, a child may pretend to drink from a toy 
cup. By eighteen months pretense involves inanimate 
objects as recipients of pretend actions initiated by the 
child. Toddlers are able to pair related activities in 
single-scheme combinations such as feeding a doll pretend 
food. By the end of the second year, children can combine 
a series of acts around a theme such as kissing a doll, 
putting her in a toy bed and covering herewith a blanket. 
Between eighteen and twenty-four months, toddlers 
demonstrate the capacity to integrate symbolic play 
actions into larger, more complex organized sequences with 
other participants. 
While extensive research exists to document toddler's 
independent symbolic play, other studies have shown that 
the social context in which play occurs has an important 
influence on toddler's emerging pretend play. Toddlers 
have been found to engage in more advanced forms of 
symbolic play when they are pretending with a more skilled 
partner than when they are playing alone (Beizer and 
Howes, 1992). 
Most previous research on children's early symbolic 
development and play behavior has concentrated on the 
mother-child relationship (Farver, 1995). Werner and 
Kaplan (1963) claim that mothers are children's earliest 
play partners. According to their theory, early pretend 
play begins during the child's active experimentation with 
objects and in seeking confirmation of the developing 
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symbols from the mother. Previous research has shown that 
mothers facilitate or scaffold young children's beginning 
attempts at pretense. As mothers provide suggestions and 
communicate the rules of playing pretend, children 
incorporate maternal guidance into their play sequences 
and gradually begin to construct complex pretend play 
scripts and enact roles. During play, mothers and 
children learn to coordinate their actions and with 
maternal guidance, children can perform beyond their 
existing level of competence (Farver and Howes, 1993). 
Although scholars have focused on the cognitive, 
creative, and affective implications of pretend play 
(e.g., Piaget, 1962; Singer and Singer, 1990), increasing 
evidence of mothers' involvement in children's early 
pretending (e.g., Garvey, 1990) raises questions about its 
possible role in social development. During open-ended 
interviews concerning the role of pretend play in the 
development of their two-year-old children (Haight, 1994), 
several mothers spontaneously commented on their own 
deliberate use of pretend play during problematic everyday 
activities (e.g., "We pretend during meals. It 
[restaurant game] helps him eat;" "We pretend a lot in the 
car. It gives us something to do when we are riding. 
It's a good way to pass time and spend time together;" and 
"We use [pretending] a lot when she's getting out of hand. 
Sometimes we use play to control her behavior."). In 
addition, Katz, Kramer and Gottman (1992) observed that 
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preschool-aged children who demonstrate competence with 
conflict management with peers often use pretend play 
during disagreements. These observations suggest that 
pretend play may be a useful tool for flexibly negotiating 
problematic situations. 
The earliest suggestions of pretense are mere indica¬ 
tions that the child is on the cusp of discovering the 
power of pretense. The child touches a baby bottle to the 
doll's mouth, puts an empty toy cup to her mouth, or holds 
a toy telephone receiver to her ear. These gestures 
indicate that the child has some understanding of how 
these toys can be used symbolically, but she offers no 
confirming evidence that she is really pretending to feed 
the baby, drink from the cup, or talk on the telephone. 
These early gestures are important acts for the care¬ 
givers to observe and act upon (Gowen, 1995). By 
responding to the child's pre-pretense gestures as though 
the child were actually pretending, the caregiver can 
nudge the child gently over the line into the next period 
of development. When the child puts the toy bottle to the 
doll's mouth, the caregiver can say, "Oh, you're feeding 
your baby. You're such a good daddy!" This response 
affirms the pretense nature of the child's act. Care¬ 
givers can make similar responses to other pre-pretense 
acts. When a child pushes a toy car across the floor, the 
caregiver can say, "You're driving your car. Brumm, 
brumm. I'd better get out of your way!" When the child 
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puts the toy telephone to her ear, the caregiver can say, 
"You're talking on the telephone. Who are you talking to? 
Your mommy?" (Gowen, 1995). 
Indeed, observational evidence confirms that care¬ 
takers do attempt to structure a child's pretense by 
supplying appropriate cues. Miller and Garvey (1984) 
report that, when mothers encouraged two-year-olds to 
engage in pretend, they "arranged the situation in which 
such play took place and provided props, including toy 
replicas of clothing, dishes, bottles and so on. This 
kind of maternal scaffolding means that children may 
complement their partner's pretense without under¬ 
standing what their partner is pretending to do. 
There is consistent evidence from several different 
laboratories that toddlers' pretend play is more sophis¬ 
ticated when their caretaker is available as a play 
partner. Although this facilitation might be interpreted 
as evidence that toddlers understand their mothers' 
pretense overtures, it is also possible that toddlers 
benefit chiefly from the props, demonstrations, and cues 
that mothers supply. Indeed, positive signs of misunder¬ 
standing have been observed. 
Children also engage in more sophisticated play after 
watching an adult engage in pretense. However, such post- 
modeling effects provide an equivocal index of children's 
comprehension. They might copy an adult's pretend action 
with no understanding of its nonliteral meaning; 
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alternatively, they may understand that nonliteral meaning 
but have difficulty reenacting it. 
Cognitive Development and Representation in Pretend Play 
Current literature suggests that pretend play may 
make a major contribution to cognitive and socio-emotional 
development (Gordon, 1993). This information implies that 
pretend activity may have both socioaffective and 
intellectual growth. Research has suggested that short- 
and long-term narrative activity may help the child's 
ability to pretend effectively. In most theories of 
cognition and cognitive development, the social and the 
cognitive make contact only minimally as separate domains 
of functioning. Thus, Berk (1994) emphasized regarding 
what the young child knows as personally rather than 
socially constructed - a tradition that follows from the 
massive contributions of cognitive developmental theory to 
the field. 
To review developmental consequences, existing 
literature regarding adaptive pretend play has addressed 
both cognitive and socioemotional issues. In the cogni¬ 
tive area, research has suggested that the development of 
pretend play incorporates several cognitive-developmental 
issues, all related to the growth of less concrete and 
more coordinated thinking. These include: (a) 
decentration, or the growing ability to direct pretense 
away from the self and incorporate other independently 
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active players; (b) decontextualization, or less reliance 
6 
on prototypical play objects as the objects of pretend 
play, and (c) integration, or the capacity to combine 
separate actions into increasingly coordinated sequences 
of behaviors (Fenson, 1984) . 
Many researchers have shown that children of around 
three years of age are perfectly able to understand or 
make sense of pretend play acts carried out by another 
child. Specifically, Piaget's theory suggests that 
functional developmental mechanisms are practiced when the 
child actively participates with objects. "Developmental 
acquisitions such as effective symbolization (ability to 
differentiate signifier from signified) are therefore 
ultimately based on the child's abilities and 
opportunities to interact adaptively with objects" 
(Gordon, 1993). This assumption readily highlights 
children's interactions with pretend play objects as a 
potentially important context for cognitive development. 
However, the developmental issues of pretend play involve 
the construction of general cognitive structures which 
influence affective and interpersonal knowledge. 
Theorists have adapted Piagetian principles to the study 
of socioemotional knowledge. According to Gordon (1993), 
first is the idea that knowledge about affective and 
interpersonal issues may be modified by the functional 
mechanisms of assimilation and accommodation. Second is 
the idea that structural acquisitions such as 
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classification and perspective-taking abilities offer 
individuals advantages in resolving social and inter¬ 
personal dilemmas. Third, certain socioemotional 
experiences may resist integration into higher-order 
cognitive structures, thereby leaning encapsulated, 
nondeveloping cognitions around specific interpersonal 
structures. These principles of cognitive and social- 
cognitive development will be influenced by the socio¬ 
emotional consequences of adaptive pretend play. 
Harris and Kavanaugh's (1993) suggestions imply that 
the relations between pretense comprehension and the 
comprehension of text - particularly narrative text - may 
go beyond verbal fluency. The child's pretend play might 
provide a cognitive foundation not only for games of make- 
believe but also for responding to narration. 
Leslie's (1987) perspective of pretend play is fre¬ 
quently interpreted as viewing pretend play as an activity 
in which children show advanced cognitive development with 
regard to representing others' mental representations. 
Leslie also described the infant initially as having only 
primary representations of the world: she sees the world 
directly, and represents it as it is. For example, a 
child's primary representation of a banana would be 
interrupted by watching someone pretend a banana was a 
telephone: the child would start to think of a banana as 
something you talk into. Subsequently, the child may 
develop another representation, meta.representa.tion, which 
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is secondary representations or representations of 
representations. Secondary representations occur when one 
object can substitute for a different object without the 
child confusing actual semantic relations. 
Lillard (1993) noted that pretend play always entails 
a mental representational component, and sometimes is also 
accompanied by an action component. It is necessary to 
understand the representational component of pretense that 
requires a representation, i.e., one person representing a 
doll as a mom. It also is necessary to understand the 
action component that someone is acting out the doll as if 
it were a baby. The representational component is 
critical to pretend for both action and representation. 
For example, a doll may be a rabbit in a pretend play that 
it is mentally represented by the pretender as a rabbit. 
However, Leslie's (1993) argument strongly implies that 
pretense is an area in which children display early 
competence for understanding mental representation. 
However, theories of pretend play uniformly propose that 
fundamental cognitive changes underlie the emergence of 
pretense which may be indicative of a major change in 
cognitive development. 
In sum, pretend play raises the possibility that the 
cognitive structure for pretend play creates a zone of 
proximal development in the child's acquisition of 
metarepresentational abilities. 
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Social Pretend Plav Functions 
Early childhood researchers emphasize that pretend 
play is a vital part of a child's early development. 
Educational researchers have emphasized the importance of 
incorporating pretend play into early childhood education 
curricula and the close monitoring of children's play 
behaviors in the classroom (Weinberger and Starkey, 1994). 
Farver (1992) notes that social pretend play presents a 
special communicative context within which meaning is 
often interpreted and expressed differently from conven-. 
tional representations. 
The links between pretend play and children's 
cognitive and social competence have been important areas 
for research and theory development for several decades 
(Youngblade and Dunn, 1995) . Researchers have studied, 
for example, the relation of pretense to language 
development, perspective taking, individual differences in 
family interactions, and friendship formation during 
preschool and the kindergarten years. Recently, this area 
of research has grown to include theoretical interest in 
the links between pretense and the child's developing 
"theory of mind" (Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993). 
Pretend play makes its appearance during the second 
year of life, and research studies have typically 
emphasized an individual child playing in the presence of 
an adult, usually the parent, most often the mother. 
During this stage of development the emphasis has been on 
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cognition with little attention given to social pretend 
play characteristics. The work of McCune, Kalmanson, 
Fleck, Glazewski, and Sillari (1990) is typical of 
research in this area in which cognition is portrayed as 
representational play. By contrast the research 
literature for the age range of three to six years is 
primarily with little attention to cognition. 
The conceptual frame that combines cognitive, trans¬ 
actional and management aspects into joint elaboration 
emphasizes interaction and cooperative formats of 
different types of shared activities between children, 
including social pretend play. Sibling pretend play is a 
neglected area of research that could prove especially 
productive for the investigation of cooperative tasks. 
Pretend play is also an attractive area of research for 
those interested in a developmental theory of mind because 
it joins symbolic transformations, individual 
representations, desires, shared meanings and 
interpersonal negotiations (Verba, 1993). 
Interestingly, however, pretend play skills required 
to engage in pretend play appear to emerge earlier than 
the child's understanding of false belief (Harris and 
Kavanaugh, 1993) . Thus, a reasonable hypothesis is that 
children who are adept at fantasy play have experiences 
that help them master the relation between mental life and 
the real world (Taylor, Cartwright, and Carlson, 1993). 
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Flavell and Green (1987) suggest that pretending 
might facilitate a child's understanding of the distinc¬ 
tion between internal mental representations of external 
stimuli and the stimuli themselves. And, in fact, studies 
that examine the distinction between internal mental 
representations and external entities have demonstrated 
that, upon request, children can imagine or pretend that a 
given entity is in a given place, and they can then talk 
about the products of those pretend or imagined represen¬ 
tations (Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993). Once the distinc¬ 
tion is practiced and mastered in pretend play, then, 
children might be better equipped to think about similar 
distinctions in other situations or contexts (Taylor, 
Cartwright, and Carlson, 1993). And, in fact, some data 
support this contention. Chandler, Fritz, and Hala (1991) 
and by Jenkins and Astington (1993). Conversely, however, 
Lillard's (1993b) experimental data suggest that children 
under the age of six may not understand that pretending 
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that pretense involves representing an alternate reality 
may emerge later than they understand this about false 
belief. 
In an analysis of developmental sequences in the 
emergence of social pretend play, Howes et al. (1989) 
suggested that when children first attempt to integrate 
nonliteral meaning and role exchanges they enact 
nonliteral role exchanges without engaging in 
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metacommunication about pretend play. These play forms 
may result because enactment of the nonliteral appears to 
precede verbal communication about the nonliteral, 
particularly when the partner is also a nonexpert pretend 
player (Howes, Unger, and Matheson, 1991). These 
cooperative social pretend play forms appear more complex 
than the role exchanges of the toddler period because 
nonliteral meaning has been added to the play. 
The assumption that pretense is linked in some way to 
properties of the semiotic system is shared by Piaget, 
Leslie, and Ariel, even though each makes different use of 
this assumption. No account is parsimonious insofar as 
each posits special features of mind, special pretend 
functions, and even special pretend contents. Special 
features of mind appear either in the mental processes 
responsible for pretend representations or in the memoric 
sources from which the contents of these representations 
are drawn. 
Piaget proposed that pretense marked the emergence of 
a generalized semiotic function ultimately responsible for 
the acquisition of a diverse symbol system. This function 
accounts for the mind's capacity to "know" three things: 
(a) that some entities (acts, objects, or events) operate 
as "signifiers" of other entities; (b) that the relation¬ 
ship between signifier and signified is defined by 
stipulation; and (c) that meaning is what is stipulated. 
The semiotic function permits a pattern of sounds to mean 
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an object or an event; a two-dimensional picture to mean a 
three-dimensional object; an internal image to mean an 
experience; or, a miniature figure to mean a person. 
Prior to the emergence of the semiotic function, the child 
is certainly able to remember experiences. What the 
presemiotic child can not do is appreciate the special 
status of a "signifier" as perceptually different from yet 
meaning that which is signified. The ability to pretend 
emerges in an ordered sequence. Although Piaget 
masterfully described phases in the development of the 
ludic symbol, he did not for the most part reference these 
phases to more general semiotic processes. Rather, Piaget 
tied the semiotic function to mechanisms of assimilation 
and accommodation. 
This disequilibrium of mind is a temporary develop¬ 
mental state. Ludic symbols evolve toward a straight¬ 
forward copy of reality as the child moves toward concrete 
operational thinking. Ludic symbols are transitional, 
aberrant forms. As the child's mind develops, symbols 
increasingly gain their meaning from sociocultural 
processes rather than from individual assimilative 
processes. Piaget thus accounts for symbolic play by 
positing special mental conditions, disequilibrium and 
distorting assimilation. The first condition permits a 
state of mental detachment from the immediate environment 
and the second permits personal, subjective 
interpretations of objects, actions, or events. 
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Social pretend play is an activity that becomes more 
frequent and more complex during the preschool and 
kindergarten years (Rubin, Fein, and Vandenberg, 1983). 
Although extensive research has been devoted to the 
relationships between the development of language and the 
appearance of pretend, or symbolic play (e.g., Fenson, 
1984), there has been little investigation into the 
development of the language used in social pretending. 
This is somewhat surprising for three reasons. First, it 
is generally recognized that social pretending relies 
heavily on verbal communication, both in the negotiations 
by which roles are assigned, objects and locations trans¬ 
formed, and action plans developed and in the actual 
performance, or enactment, of pretend scenarios (Ariel, 
1984; McCune-Nicolich, 1981). Not only the players 
themselves, but also researchers studying play must depend 
on verbally encoded indications of what roles, objects, 
settings, and actions are "on the stage" at any point 
during a pretend engagement. Second, it is known that 
language continues to develop during the preschool years. 
As this is the period during which social pretend play 
also exhibits development, (Iwanaga, 1973), one might 
suspect that pretend interactions are activity settings in 
which emerging linguistic capabilities would be reflected. 
Third, some evidence suggests that once social pretending 
appears, certain of its structural constituents that are 
represented primarily in verbal communication continue to 
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change and develop. These constituents include use of 
ideational (i.e., imaginary) transforms; greater diversity 
of role types and more complex action plans; as well as 
use of metacommunicative messages. 
Engagement in collaborative pretend play has been 
linked with the development of young children's social 
competencies. Experimental training studies have demon¬ 
strated that participation in pretend play can enhance 
children's role-taking skills, group cooperation, and 
group participation. Observational studies in 
naturalistic settings have established that the frequency 
with which a child engages in social pretend play is 
positively related to peer popularity and social role¬ 
taking ability (Connolly and Doyle, 1984). 
Developmental theorists have suggested that the 
process of pretend enactment assists the child in forming 
conceptual distinctions between object and action, and 
between self and other. It has also been argued that the 
enactment of pretend identities and everyday activities 
leads to the extraction of social rules and to the 
development of social role understanding (Fein, 1981). 
According to Kavanaugh and Harris (1994), in understanding 
pretend transformations, it is likely that children use a 
partner's gestures as a guide or scaffold with which to 
reconstruct a richer make-believe world in their 
imagination. 
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"The relations between children's pretend play and 
language rests on constructivist principles drawn from 
Piaget's theory of cognitive development, results of 
research studies and delineation of pretend play actions" 
(Yawkey, 1983). 
Pretend play develops around age two with the onset 
of language and continues to ages eleven or twelve with 
rule-governed play increasing in importance. The core 
component between pretend play and language is represen¬ 
tational thought - i.e., the cognitive capacity to 
construct mental elements that stand for raw perceptions 
and actions and the capacity to manipulate these elements 
according to coherent and fundamental logical principles 
(Fein, 1978; Piaget, 1962). Theoreticians such as Fein 
(1978) and Nicolich (1975) have explained the relation of 
mental representation to pretend play and language in a 
number of ways. First, youngsters identify, define, and 
assign roles in their pretend which require motor actions. 
These motor actions provide feedback in social content and 
link motor, cognitive and verbal elements to reality. 
This motor feedback becomes an integral part of learning 
concepts and may even symbolize them. 
Second, the youngsters in pretend play are immersed 
in a sea of words and roles which relate their social 
behaviors to their activities. Through these imaginative 
roles youngsters imitate and create novel actions from 
those that they have observed in the adult world. 
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The third link between pretend play and language 
through mental representations is creative expression 
(Smilansky, 1968). Pretend play helps children to create 
novel statements and actions. Many of these novel 
statements and actions have no known models or direct 
antecedents (Piaget, 1962). Creative expression emerges 
from the demands of the dialogue and situation in pretend 
play. 
The fourth link between pretend play and language is 
concentration (Smilansky, 1968). This link focuses on the 
youngster's attention to objects, situations, people, and 
actions used in pretend play. Pretend play strengthens 
concentration as youngsters communicate and demonstrate 
their enactments. 
Related to the fourth is the fifth link, decentering. 
Pretend play fosters decentering. Decentering is the 
ability to perceive, understand and consider 
simultaneously the varied or multiple aspects of objects, 
events and situations (Fenson and Ramsay, 1980). Through 
pretend play, youngsters shift their conceptual schemata 
between symbolically transformed and immediately present 
stimuli. This conceptual shifting of cognitive schemata 
provides distance from or a break between stimuli in the 
environment and is the foundation for mental 
representation and cognitive operativity (Piaget, 1962). 
From a constructivist perspective, pretend play and 
language growth are related through representational 
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thought -- i.e., the intellectual capacity to construct 
mental elements that stand for raw perceptions and actions 
and the capacity to manipulate these elements according to 
coherent and logical principles. Fundamental to represen¬ 
tational thought are five connectives at the theoretical 
level which link together pretend play and language 
growth: motor actions, roles and role changes, creative 
expression, concentration and decentration. At the 
research level, results of selected studies (e.g., 
Smilansky, 1968) show not only that pretend play and 
language growth are associated but also that pretend play 
in dramatic and sociodramatic form can assist 
communication -- both oral and written. Finally the 
pretend play actions crucial to sociodramatic play and 
growth and language are: make-believe with objects, 
situations and actions role play, imitative role play, and 
interaction and verbal communication. 
Consequently, pretend play may provide a context for 
both the exercise of existing cognitive functions and the 
creation of new cognitive structures. In the socio- 
emotional realm, play may help masters developmental 
conflict and resolve painful affective experience by 
providing an opportunity for catharsis, by enabling the 
child to exercise control during enacted traumatic or 
painful events, by symbolizing conflict consciously or 
unconsciously in a safe context, and by providing 
occasions for reciprocity and moral development. 
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Theoretical Models for Pretend Play 
Theoretical models for pretend play that will be 
discussed here include Piaget's theory, Leslie's theory, 
and Perner's theory. 
Piaget's Theory 
Piaget's theory has been so influential, it is 
important to highlight its main features. Pretend play is 
identified as part of a wide-ranging semiotic function 
that emerges in the course of the second year. Harris and 
Kavanaugh (1993) argue that Piaget's tendency to view 
pretense as an inferior semiotic mode leads him to ignore 
or undervalue three distinctive features of pretend play: 
pretend transformations, the use of nonliteral language, 
and the fictional status of pretense. 
In pretend transformation, it can be seen as an 
example that if a piece of Play-Doh signifies a sausage, 
handing over a piece of Play-Doh is tantamount to handing 
over a serving of sausage. Piaget also repeated the 
conceptual dichotomy between signs and symbols for non¬ 
literal language which combines certain features of 
ordinary linguistic signs with those of props. Further, 
it was interesting that Piaget acknowledged that the child 
used pretense to represent fictional characters, i.e., a 
child can pretend to be asleep on Christmas Eve, in the 
hope of glimpsing Santa Claus (Harris and Kavanaugh, 
1993) . 
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Leslie's Theory 
Leslie (1987) presented a theoretical analysis of the 
representational nature of pretense that underlies the 
ability to pretend. He suggested that what he saw was the 
danger of "representational abuse." It's possible to 
consider a child pretending that a banana is a telephone. 
According to Harris and Kavanaugh (1993), one way for the 
child to represent this pretend link is to connect two 
ordinary mental concepts -- the concept for banana and the 
concept for telephone. The two conceptual connections 
between telephone and banana are dangerous. 
Leslie achieved the decoupling model with several 
steps. For example, decoupled statements such as "This 
empty cup contains coffee" are linked to special factors 
adopting particular propositional attitudes. Leslie 
demonstrates that the child can recognize that pretending 
is a particular mental attitude tied to a particular 
agent, i.e., a young child is capable of metarepresenta¬ 
tion: the ability to represent a mental state such as 
pretending. 
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) highlighted the 
difference between decoupling and flagging in the 
following way: decoupling starts from a prop such as a 
cup or banana; but a series of computational steps that 
include coping and editing the conceptual entry for that 
prop, it eventually arrives at a decoupled statement that 
specifies that pretend contents or identity of the prop. 
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Flagging works in the opposite direction; it starts from a 
pretend stipulation, and that stipulation is directed at a 
prop or set of props within the immediate situation. 
In Leslie's approach, he is concerned with forms of 
play that exhibit the pretense forms of object substitu¬ 
tion, attribution of pretend properties, and the invention 
of imaginary objects. Hobson (1990) described Leslie's 
(1987) theory as the forms of pretense that are as they 
are simply because pretending involved the practice of the 
child's awareness of the relationships that existed 
between human beings and the world. 
Perner's Theory 
Perner (1991) argues that young children proceed 
through three levels of 'semantic awareness.' At the 
initial level of semantic awareness, young children have a 
'mental model' of the world. This model is determined 
veridically by perception, and consists of primary 
representations. It represents the world of "as-if" mode 
and makes up a non-manipulable knowledge base. 
Perner differs from Leslie in that he views the child 
as acquiring an explicit theory of the representational 
nature of mental states. However, Perner's conception of 
metarepresentation amounts to much the same as Leslie's 
metarepresentation, in that it involves representing 
another's representational relation to the world (Jarrold, 
Smith, and Boucher, 1994). 
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Perner suggests that in pretense children create a 
counterfactual model of the pretend situation. Within the 
scope of his theory, this ability is available to children 
operating at the second level of semantic awareness. In 
other words, this can be done using hypothetical, counter- 
factual secondary representations and does not require 
metarepresentations. It might be argued that these 
hypothetical models, originating from the knowledge base, 
are representations of the primary representations in the 
base. Perner proposes this possible objection by pointing 
out that the counterfactual pretend models are still 
models of the external world. 
Finally, Perner claimed that when young children 
engaged in pretend play, they mentally represented a 
fictional situation. Thus, there are clear parallels 
between Perner's and Leslie's theories of pretense. In 
fact, Perner's counterfactual mental models are 
hypothetical, they are detached from reality and are 
therefore 'decoupled.' Because they are separate from the 
knowledge base, they are 'quarantined' from it. Perner 
circumvents the problem of representational abuse in much 
the same way as Leslie: he agrees that a child can not 
concurrently hold two semantically conflicting primary 
representations. Where he differs from Leslie is in his 
sue of secondary representations as opposed to meta¬ 
representations (Jarrold, Smith and Boucher, 1994). 
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The Relationships between Storytelling and Pretend Play 
and Educational Implications 
"Storytelling is an ancient and wonderful artform 
capable of transforming otherwise rote reading and 
language development activities into simulating 
experiences" (Cooter, 1991). When matched to required 
curricula, children are able to transfer needed narrative 
strategies to meaningful literary genres. In fact, 
stories make sense and are memorable so that children 
become capable of comprehending and using the informa¬ 
tional structure in stories around the time that they 
begin formal schooling (Varnhagen and Everall, 1994). 
Language development has been linked to different 
narrative styles during parent-child storybook readings 
(Allison and Watson, 1994) . Specifically, retelling 
includes greater elaboration and cognitive structuring of 
information that has been read. Newton (1994) described 
materials that were intended to develop reading skills 
such as pictures. Researchers have raised several 
important issues related to studies using retelling, 
particularly with respect to how the storytelling task is 
structured (Gambrell and Koskinen, 1991). 
Children's pretend play can be used as a tool for 
assessing children's symbolic competence and narrative 
structure. "One reason for this relationship is that 
pretend play is assumed to reflect children's emerging 
representational abilities and thus provides valuable 
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information about their social and cognitive development" 
(Lyytinen, 1995) . When children are engaging in pretend 
play, they are usually functioning, talking, dramatizing, 
storytelling, and narrating close to their optimal level, 
as they exhibit their existing skills and try out new 
undeveloped ones. 
Pretend play involves the use of both actions and 
language to depict events (Lyytinen, 1991). Pretend play 
requires complex cognitive and social skills such as 
sharing, cooperation, self-regulation of affect, and 
behavioral role reciprocity (Werebe and Baudonniere, 
1991). It can also express mutual comprehension of 
symbolic language and the capacity to coordinate partners' 
activities. Kane and Furth (1993) specify in detail how 
pretend play abounds in societal features, such as shared 
values and assumptions, traditions, history, rules, desire 
for mutual recognition, and use of pretend for inter¬ 
personal advantage. 
In order to pretend with other players, children must 
attend in the appropriate ways to executing pretend 
activities. For example, "pretend play activity is free- 
flowing in nature, in contrast to structured laboratory 
problem-solving activity, in which children are expected 
to reach predefined solutions" (Goncu, 1993). 
In some schools and kindergartens, story playing is a 
regular activity. Children have the option each day to 
dictate a "story play" to a teacher. Later it is enacted 
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by their friends during circle time. Story playing helps 
children develop the numerous forms of expression, both 
verbal and nonverbal, that fulfill the fundamental purpose 
of communicating the child's needs, interests, and 
desires. For the young child, these larger purposes of 
language provide the motivation and framework for later 
literacy development. Above all, "social pretend 
enactment is conceptually distinct from the initiation and 
termination of narratives of pretend play, which may 
include sequences of preparation for, negotiation of, and 
enactment of pretend" (Doyle, Doehring, and Tessier, 
1992) . 
The essential aspect of storytelling and pretend play 
emerges at the same time as the ongoing activity. For 
instance, a doll is treated in play as if it could create 
imaginary objects in the absence of real toy elements. In 
this situation, the child shows a tendency to perform 
pretend actions on substitute objects and to integrate 
pretend play acts into coordinated behavior with story 
sequences. During storytelling and pretend play, children 
can recall and deal with unpleasant experiences by 
pretending the event happened to other characters such as 
picture-like animals or doll-like animals. "Pretend play 
and story narratives can also enhance children with the 
opportunities to reverse the roles they play in reality" 
(Farver and Frosch, 1996). According to Farver and Frosch 
(1996), during storytelling and pretend play children use 
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metaphors to help distance themselves from the characters 
and the context being portrayed, which affords a feeling 
of safety and allows them to enact upsetting events more 
easily. Thus children's pretend play and narratives are 
considered to be basic developmental factors for under¬ 
standing children's views of the world and their 
experiences. Further, children tend to construct play 
scenarios and talk about what they learn or have 
experienced. 
Consequently, social pretend play can be facilitated 
by the children's story, familiarity with each other and 
their prior group experience. Pretend play is also a 
powerful context and an excellent example of what might be 
called the natural exercise of skills. Therefore, 
children are pretending with the influence of contextual 
factors which relate to social and representational 
communication in the proportion and emergence of complex 
play. Furthermore, the vast literature on children's 
storytelling and pretend play reveals that its contribu¬ 
tions to child development can be looked at from diverse 
vantage points. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection 
The present study used storytelling and pretend play 
to examine the influence of encoding and inferences upon 
short- and long-term narrative recall in four- and five- 
year-old children. The data collection methods are 
organized below according to the phase of the research. 
Phase 1: During Phase 1 the researcher spent at 
least two hours in each classroom becoming familiar with 
the children. The researcher also spent half of the time 
observing and taking notes. The other half of the time 
was spent working with the children. The latter activity 
served not only to establish the researcher's role but 
also allowed time for individual children to make-up a 
story from the pictures of seven animals (a rabbit, a 
frog, an elephant, a leopard, a rhinoceros, a bad animal, 
and a caterpillar). 
Phase 2: During Phase 2 the researcher began the 
process of conducting the research. This phase lasted 
four to five weeks. During this period the researcher was 
in the classroom from Monday through Friday each week. 
The researcher arrived at the classroom around 9:00 AM and 
departed around 1:00 PM. During this period, the 
researcher asked to tell the stories to the children and 
then the researcher recorded their narrative structures 
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and pretend play enactments. Observations and informal 
dialogues based on children's behavior entries continued 
to take place. These dialogues were audio recorded as 
individual discussions for storytelling and enactment. 
However, the researcher chose to audiotape and openly 
take notes after the actual enactment and narration, but 
within the setting, and then wrote the notes away from the 
setting. The researcher also divided the notes into more 
codable blocks. When describing an event and the child's 
narration, the researcher left some blank space before 
describing the next event. These data sheets and audio 
recordings were then used as the raw data for the quanti¬ 
tative analysis. 
Subiects 
A total of thirty-two children, thirteen girls and 
nineteen boys who were attending preschool and kinder¬ 
garten participated in this study. The children ranged 
from 4.0 to 4.6 years of age for preschool children and 
from 5.1 to 5.6 years of age for the kindergarten 
children. The majority of children came from middle- 
class to upper-middle class homes. The mean educational 
level of the parents was 17.4 years. Ninety-four percent 
of the children were White; three percent Asian; three 
percent Black. 
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Materials 
The materials for the pretend play tasks consisted of 
seven small doll-like animals: a rabbit, a frog, a 
jackal, an elephant, a leopard, a rhinoceros and a cater¬ 
pillar. For the storytelling task, seven pictures of 
animals were used. These pictures portrayed the same as 
the above toys. 
Design and Procedures 
Each child was tested by a female researcher. This 
study had three different phases: (1) storytelling, 
pictures and dolls, (2) the research phase, and (3) long¬ 
term retention (one week later). 
This research project was based on the book, "Who is 
in Rabbit's House?." This story is an African folktale 
about a rabbit. It is a sequential story which begins 
with the rabbit sitting outside her house. A voice from 
within warns the rabbit not to enter because dire things 
will befall the intruder. The rabbit has a sequence of 
encounters with a frog, a jackal, an elephant, a leopard, 
a rhinoceros and a caterpillar. Finally, the frog 
pretending to be a spitting cobra frightens the 
caterpillar into coming out of Rabbit's House. 
Please see Figure 1, the research design. The story, 
Who is in Rabbit's House?, was read to all children, indi¬ 
vidually, prior to the start of the study. Immediately 
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after reading the story, at Time I, the children were 
shown the seven pictures and asked to recall the story 
that had been read to them. Next the children were asked 
eight questions to test their knowledge of the content of 
the story. The children in Groups 2 and 4 were presented 
with seven doll like figures of the animals from the 
story, and they were asked to pretend play the story with 
the dolls. These children were then asked the eight 
questions which tested their knowledge of the content of 
the story. 
Time I Time II Time III 
Picture 
Condition: 
Narrative 
Questions 
Doll Condition: 
Pretend Play 
Questions 
Figure 1. Research Design for Times I, II, and III 
[Note: Picture Condition: Eight 4-year-old and eight 5- 
year-old children (groups 1 and 3), Doll Condition: Eight 
4-year-old and eight 5-year-old children (groups 2 and 
4.)] 
No Doll Condit¬ 
ion: Pretend 
Play 
Questions_ 
Pictures: 
Narrative 
Questions 
Dolls: 
Pretend Play 
Questions 
No Picture 
Condition: 
Narrative 
Questions 
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One week later at Time II, the children in Groups 1 
and 3 were presented with the original pictures that they 
had been shown previously and asked to tell the story 
again (Would you tell me the story about Rabbit's House 
again?). The eight questions were asked with the pictures 
placed before the child. 
One week later at Time II, the children in Groups 2 
and 4 who had participated in doll condition previously 
were presented with the dolls again. They were asked, 
"Would you tell me the story about 'Rabbit's House' 
again?" At this point the children were asked the eight 
questions about the content of the story. 
At Time III, three days after Time II, the no picture 
and no doll conditions took place. The children in the no 
picture condition were asked to remember the story and 
then they were asked the eight questions. At the same 
time the children in the no doll condition completed a 
similar research condition. They, too, were asked to 
remember the story and then were asked the eight 
questions. The eight questions were asked to assess 
encoding and inferences. All sessions were tape-recorded 
and spontaneous discussions relevant to pretense was later 
transcribed. 
Measures and Scoring 
Two types of measures were used in this study. 
First, procedures were devised to measure narrative 
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complexity in both the storytelling and the pretend play 
conditions. Secondly, two types of memory questions were 
used. Four questions were intended to tap memory for 
detail (or encoding). Another four questions were 
designed to measure inferences not directly stated in the 
story. 
The story "Who is in Rabbit's House?" lends itself to 
narrative analysis. This study used the narrative 
procedures developed by Leondar (1977) and elaborated on 
by Benson (1993). This set of procedures provided a means 
of sorting the narrative skills of young children into 
four different levels of complexity. This approach 
permitted the researcher to look for narrative competence 
among kindergarten and preschool children, as a result of 
the two procedures. 
The following system, based on Leondar (1977), was 
used to assign storytelling to levels of structural 
complexity having ordinal properties. 
(1) Non-response. If the child did not produce a 
fictional narrative involving the characters for 
the task, that was designated as a non-response. 
(2) Description. If a narrative was produced that 
had no temporarily related sequence of events in 
it, this was designated a description. Descrip¬ 
tions often sounded like the opening orientation 
for a story. 
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(3) Sequential Narration. Having a sequence of 
events was a category in and of itself. 
(4) Plotted Narrations. Narratives that had a 
sequence of events were examined for the 
presence of all four phases of Leondar's primary 
narrative. Only those that had all four phases 
were classified as being "Plotted." 
In Table 1 there are examples of the different kinds 
of narratives children actually invented. 
Subsequently, each narrative was transcribed verbatim 
and was coded for its narrative structure. 
A second procedure was used to analyze pretend play. 
For the sake of discussion below, it is necessary to 
Table 1 
Examples of Narrative Structure 
Description 
1. Rabbit was sitting in front of her house and she 
was waiting for sometone. Because she didn't enter her 
house. The rabbit saw that a frog was coming. 
(Boy, age 5. Storytelling) 
Sequential Narratives 
2. Once upon a time a rabbit wanted to get her 
house, but some bad animal didn't come out. And a frog 
came to rabbit and the frog said, "what are you doing 
here?" "I can help you." And then a leopard came by. He 
said "Why aren't you trying to get into your house? And 
then some other animals came by. 
(Boy, age 5 1/2. Storytelling) 
(Continued next page) 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
3. The rabbit was trying to enter her house, but 
big animal was there. And then a frog wanted to help her, 
but he couldn't. The rabbit cried and said "this is my 
house." A rhinoceros came by and he asked "what are you 
doing here?" And then a jackal came by. He said "Are you 
making a farm here?" 
(Girl, age 5 1/2. Pretend Play) 
Plotted Narratives 
4. Rabbit sits at his door. Then when animals come 
to the lake they see Rabbit sitting at his door. Then one 
day when Rabbit was going home he couldn't open his door. 
The rabbit said, "Who's in my house?" And the animal in 
his house said, "I'm the long one. I eat leaves from the 
trees and trample an elephant. And then a frog came to 
ask Rabbit why you were sitting on a log not in front of 
your house and Rabbit said because someone was in my 
house. So, I couldn't open my door. And then another 
animal came along and asked Rabbit "why you were sitting 
on a log," and Rabbit said because someone was in my house 
and I couldn't open the door. And then a leopard came 
along and said "Who's in the house?" and the bad animal in 
the house said, "Go away." And then the leopard said "I'm 
not scared of you" and he started to break the house. And 
then an elephant came and said "Rabbit, why are you 
smoothing your roof?" And Rabbit said, "Because the 
leopard wanted to break down my house because I couldn't 
get in because somebody is there." And the rhinoceros 
came by and said, "Is anyone in your house?" And Rabbit 
said "yes, there is someone in my house and I want him to 
get out of my house." Then Rabbit sat down on the log and 
frog came over and said, "I can get that." And Rabbit 
said, "how?", and frog sai can scare him out." And frog 
said, "I will scare him out by blowing in a big leaf and 
say I am going to eat you if you don't come out." And 
then a caterpillar came running our and said, "I was just 
teasing you." And then Rabbit said, "Frog was saying that 
he was the big thing that was going to eat you." And then 
frog laughed and laughed. 
(Girl, age 5 1/2. Storytelling) 
indicate that children's play behavior was rated according 
to a scheme derived from "The Child's World of Make 
Believe" (Singer, 1973) which distinguished between play 
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in which actions and manipulations of objects are dominant 
and play in which high organization of activity is 
dominant. Table 2 describes the four levels of 
representation in play in detail. 
It should be noted that the definition of levels of 
narratives in storytelling and the definition for event 
representation in pretend play are different. 
Table 2 
Levels of Event Representation in Pretend Play 
Level 1. Introduces no pretend elements into the play 
situation. Extremely stimulus-bound by the play 
materials. Child explores pretend possi¬ 
bilities; comes up with many ideas, but neither 
develops these, nor gets involved in pretend 
play. 
Level 2. Child occasionally introduces fleeting pretend 
elements into play situation, but does not stay 
with any pretend situation for very long. No 
originality or organization found in pretend 
situations. A few pretend elements added to 
otherwise very stimulus-bound play. 
Level 3. Shows a moderate amount of pretending in his 
play, but not very original or removed from the 
actual stimulus situation. Little organization 
or consistency of pretense or role-playing. No 
voice changes or stimulated vocalizations. Con¬ 
siderable changing from one activity to another. 
Level 4. Shows a substantial amount of pretend elements 
in his play, spontaneously creating make- 
believe situations, showing some originality 
in his pretending, not changing activities very 
often. Shows high organization of activity and 
role-playing. 
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The follow-up questions were of two types. The 
specific questions in each group - Encoding and Inferences 
- are listed below: 
Encoding: 1. Who was sitting in the doorway? 2. 
Why couldn't the rabbit enter her house? 3. Who wanted 
to help the rabbit at first? 4. Who is in Rabbit's 
house? Inferences: 5. Why was the rabbit afraid to go 
into the house? 6. How did the frog scare the 
caterpillar inside the house? 7. What did the jackal, 
leopard, elephant, and rhinoceros do that was the same in 
the story?" 8. What was the difference between the frog 
and the other animals? 
Data Analysis 
The narrative structure was pre-coded for data 
processing purposes prior to its use in the study. There 
were four parts to the data analysis, corresponding to the 
four research questions to examine the following relation¬ 
ships: (1) between storytelling and pretend play, (2) 
between short- and long-term narrative recall, (3) between 
encoding and inferences, and (4) the interrelationships 
between storytelling, pretend play, and cognitive 
variables. It was anticipated that the raw scores would 
be a linear scale and that parametric statistics could be 
used to analyze these data. All data were analyzed by 
utilizing the Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) on a personal computer. The statistical analyses 
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that were used in this study ranged from descriptive to 
multivariate methods. 
\ 
First, descriptive statistics (means, variance, 
frequency, and standard error, etc.) for the major 
variables of interest were calculated. Initially, the 
narrative data were analyzed using non-parametric 
statistics (Chi-Square Analysis) and cross-tabs, using 
SPSS. The questions were analyzed using a univariate 
analysis of variance and later a multivariate analysis of 
variance. The chi-square tests of association and multi¬ 
variate analysis of variance were performed to assess the 
relationship among narration and pretend play, encoding 
and inferences, and short- and long-term retention. 
Bivariate associations between the dependent and 
independent variables were examined to identify linkages 
that were most likely to represent cognitive development. 
For the analyses of the continuous independent 
variables, the analysis of variance was employed. For 
each variable that achieved significance at P<0.05, the 
means of each possible pair of groups were tested for 
significance using the Tukey confidence interval test. 
Finally, analyses using a multivariate analysis of 
variance were performed for each dependent variable. The 
researcher also took advantage of Joreskog and Sorbom's 
(1989) LISREL 7.20 program for maximum-likelihood (ML) 
estimation of linear coveriance-structure models with 
data. The first multivariate analysis of variance focused 
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on children's memory between encoding and inference in 
order to recreate the story and pretend play that was read 
to them. However, as statistical inference procedures, 
MANOVA, were used to assess the statistical significance 
of differences between groups, MANOVA also solved our 
composite variable problem by implicitly testing the 
linear combination of the multiple variables that provided 
the strongest evidence of overall group differences. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
The results of the data analysis are presented in 
this chapter. The descriptive findings are presented 
first, followed by the results of the study as addressed 
by the research questions. 
Relationships Between Storytelling and Pretend Play in 
the Facilitation of Short-Term and Long-Term Recall 
of Narrative Structure 
The purpose of this section was to determine if there 
were significant differences between storytelling and 
pretend play in structuring narratives. Initially, non- 
parametric statistics were used to examine the contrast 
between storytelling and pretend play. 
The first question raised in the analysis was whether 
the level of narrative structure was influenced by story¬ 
telling and pretend play. The obtain chi-square analysis 
revealed that there were significant differences between 
these two different methods at the Time I condition. It 
should be noted that in the narrative condition, there are 
four different levels of narrative complexity in story¬ 
telling (Benson, 1993) . There are also four levels of 
representation in pretend play (Singer, 1973). These four 
different levels take slightly different forms within the 
storytelling and the pretend play modes. 
Table 3 presents the observed and extracted frequency 
of response for storytelling and pretend play at Time I. 
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A chi-square analysis was applied to this data that 
compared storytelling and pretend play across the four 
categories: non-response, short description, sequential, 
and plotted (Benson, 1993). The comparable categories for 
pretend play were the levels of event representation 
(Singer, 1973). A description of these four levels is 
presented in Table 2 of the Methods Section. 
Table 3 
Cross-Classifying Mode by Narrative Structure (Time I) 
Narrative Structure 
Type Non-Responses Descriptions Sequential Plotted Total 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Storytelling *3 10 1 2 16 
# (3) (5) (1.5) (6.5) 
Pretend Play *3 0 2 11 16 
# (3) (5) (1.5) (6.5) 
Total 6 10 3 13 32 
Note: * Observed 
# Expected 
X**2=16.574 
Frequency 
Frequency 
The Critical Value: 16 .266, P=0 .001 
The results of the chi-square test permitted us to 
reject the null hypothesis that there was no association 
between storytelling and pretend play because the obtained 
chi-square of 16.574 was significant at the .001 level. 
This finding indicates that the distribution of scores 
departed significantly from chance. Children in the 
pretend play condition demonstrated a higher narrative 
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structure than those in the storytelling condition at Time 
I. 
At Time II, the children were asked to retell the 
narrative with pictures or dolls with N=16 in each 
condition. A chi-square analysis was applied to the data. 
Table 4 presents the observed and expected frequency of 
narrative structure for the storytelling and pretend tasks 
at Time II. Since the computed chi-square value (8.156) 
exceeds the critical value (7.815), the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the .05 level, and the conclusion is that the 
narrative structure at Time II differs for storytelling 
and pretend play and the influence of pictures and dolls. 
Again, there were significantly higher scores for pretend 
play condition than for the storytelling conditions. 
Table 4 
Cross-Classifying Mode by Narrative Structure with 
Pictures and Dolls Condition at Time II (N=32) 
Narrative Structure 
Type Non-] Responses 
Level 1 
Descriptions 
Level 2 
Sequential 
Level 3 
Plotted 
Level 4 
Total 
Storytelling *2 
#(1.5) 
9 
(5.5) 
3 
(3.5) 
2 
(5.5) 
16 
Pretend Play *1 
#(1.5) 
2 
(5.5) 
4 
(3.5) 
9 
(5.5) 
16 
Total 3 11 7 11 32 
Note: *Observed Frequency 
#Expected Frequency 
X**2 = 8.156 . df = 3 (Critical Value=7.815), P=0.05 
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At Time III, these same groups of children attempted 
recall with the no pictures and no dolls condition (see 
Table 5). A chi-square analysis was applied to the 
narrative structure data. The resulting chi-square was 
7.19. This value approached but did not exceed the 
critical value of 7.82. Therefore it was concluded that 
there were no significant differences between the two 
conditions. 
Table 5 
Cross-Classifying Mode by Narrative Structure with No 
Pictures and No Dolls Condition at Time III 
Narrative Structure 
Type Non-Responses 
Level 1 
Descriptions 
Level 2 
Sequential 
Level 3 
Plotted 
Level 4 
Total 
Storytelling *4 7 3 2 16 
# (3) (4.5) (3.5) (5) 
Pretend Play *2 2 4 8 16 
# (3) (4.5) (3.5) (5) 
Note: *Observed Frequency 
#Expected Frequency 
X* *2=7.1858 . The Critical Value=7.815, P=0.05 
In summary, there were significant differences 
between storytelling and pretend play at Time I and Time 
II, and there was not a significant difference at Time 
III. At Time I the children were asked to remember the 
story which they had just heard. At Time I and Time II 
the children had pictures and dolls available as cues to 
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facilitate remembering. At Time III there were no cues 
available as memory aids. At Times I and II the children 
in the pretend play condition did significantly better 
than those in the storytelling condition. The advantage 
for the pretend play appears to be related to the presence 
of representational knowledge. At Time III these cues or 
representational knowledge were not present. 
Relationship Between Children's Short-Term 
and Long-Term Memory Upon Narrative 
Structure and Questions 
In both the storytelling and the pretend play 
conditions there was a younger and an older group 
resulting in four groups. The four groups were: 5-year- 
old children in the storytelling condition, 5-year-old 
children in the pretend play condition, 4-year-old 
children in the storytelling condition, and 4-year-old 
children in the pretend play condition. 
Three one-way MANOVAs were conducted to assess 
whether the four groups differed in the level of narrative 
structure, and the degree of overall cognitive processing 
as measured by eight questions, across three time periods 
(Time I, Time II, and Time III). 
The dependent variable for the first MANOVA was the 
level of narrative structure (Benson, 1993). For the 
second MANOVA, the dependent variable was a cognitive 
variable that consisted of a combined score of encoding 
and inferences (Allen, 1996). In the third MANOVA, the 
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cognitive variables of encoding and inferences were 
examined as separate cognitive variables. For each of the 
three dependent measures, MANOVAs were examined at the 
three different time periods described above. That is, at 
Time I, II and III, three sets of dependent variables 
assessing short- and long-term memories were defined with 
appropriate contrasts to test the effects of interest. 
The model appropriate for the dependent variable of 
this MANOVA design is Y=XB+E [Y:32x3, X:32x4, B:4x3, 
E=32x3] where: 
Y= [ntl ntl I ntlII] 32x6 
X= Cl 1/21 1/21 1/41] 
[1 1/21 -1/21 -1/21] 
[1 -1/21 1/21 -1/21] 
[1 -1/21 -1/21 1/41] 32x4 
B= [(u+t.) 1 (u+t.)2 (u+t.)3] 
[ (tl-t4) (tl-t4) (tl-t4)] 
[ (t2-t4) (t2-t4) (t2-t4)] 
[ (t3-t4) (t3-t4) (t3-14)] 4x3 
E= [ell el2 el3 ] 
[e21 e22 e23 ] 
[e31 e32 e33 ] 
[e41 e42 e43 ] 
[e51 e52 e53 ] 
[e61 e62 e63 ] 
[ . . ] 
[e32,1 e32,3] 
To test hypothesis, it can be shown HO: CBM=0 
i) Independent variable: 
C= [1 0 0 0] Cl=Constant 
[0 10 0] C2=Group 
[0 0 10] C3=Time 
[0 0 0 1] C4=GXT 
68 
ii) Dependent variables (Within Groups) 
M matrices: 
Ml' : [1 1 1] 
M2' : [1 0 
-1] 
[1 -1 0] 3x3 
Specific Hypotheses: 
HO: CBM=0 
HO: C1BM1=0 Average of average 
HO: C1BM2=0 Group main effects 
HO: C2BM1=0 Time 
HO: C2BM2=0 Group x time effects 
Table 6 shows the means by group and time for the 
scores on the narrative scale and the questions. 
Table 6 
Cell Means of Narrative Structure and Questions 
Dependent Variable 
Group NTI NT1I NTI II QTI QTI 1 QTI II 
1 2.375 2.5 2.5 4.5 5.625 4.875 
2 3.625 3.375 3.0 5.125 5.75 5.375 
3 1.875 2.125 1.875 3.75 4.25 4.0 
4 3.0 3.25 3.25 4.0 4.5 4.25 
Grand 
Mean 
2.72 2.8125 2.66 4.34 5.03 4.625 
NTI - Narration at Time I 
NTH - Narration at Time II 
NTI 11 - Narration at Time III 
QTI - Questions at Time I 
QTI I - Questions at Time II 
QTI 11 - Questions at Time III 
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These same data are presented in Figure 2 for narratives 
and memory questions. The scoring method method for the 
narrative scale is take from Benson (1993) and Singer 
(1972), while the scores for the questions are a sum of 
the encoding and inferences scores. 
As can be seen in Table 6 and Figure 2, the scores 
for the pretend play groups appear to be higher than those 
for the storytelling groups, on both measures. This would 
be consistent with the findings on the X**2 test. 
Secondly, the scores for Time II appear to be higher than 
those for Time I or Time III, for both narrative structure 
and for question. Finally the scores for 5-year-olds 
appear higher than those for 4-year-olds on both measures. 
These differences were analyzed with a multivariate 
analysis of variance. 
A 4 (group) x 3 (time) repeated-measure multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed on responses 
to the four categories of narrative scale. In the first 
analysis (MANOVA), group (1 vs 2 vs 3 vs 4) was the 
independent variable and level of narrative structure was 
the dependent variables for Time I, Time II and Time III. 
As shown in Table 7, Group was the only variable to 
achieve a statistically significant multivariate F, (3, 
28)=5.25, P< .005. The hypothesized interaction between 
group x time did not attain significance in the MANOVA. 
Univariate analyses (Table 8) of the effect revealed that 
statistically significant F's for Time I, F(3, 28)=4.23; 
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A: Narration 
I ®5yr Story 
I *5yr Play 
I B4yr Story 
I 04yr Play 
1 ■ Grand Mean 
Grand Mean 
4yr Play 
4yr Story 
5yr Play 
5yr Story 
B: Questions 
■ 5yr Story 
■ 5yr Play 
■ 4yr Story 
□ 4yr Play 
■ Grand Mean 
Grand Mean 
4yr Play 
4yr Story 
5yr Play 
5yr Story 
Figure 2. Sample Profiles on Cell Means of Narration and 
Questions 
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P< .014 and Time II, F(3, 28)=3.32; P< .034 were obtained. 
The F for Time III approached significance F(3, 28)=2.72; 
P< .06. 
Table 7 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Narrative 
Structure at Times I, II, and III 
Hypothesis CM' S M N F Sig. of F 
Between Subjects 
Group [0 1] [111] 3 -1/2 12 5.25 0.005 
Within Subjects 
Time [1 0] [1-10] 
[1 0 -1 ] 1 0 12.1/2 0.073 0.790 
Between/Within 
Group x Time [1-10] 
[1 0 -1 ] 2 0 12,1/2 0.701 0.559 
Table 8 
Univariate F-tests with (3, 28) D.F. for Narration 
Variable Hypot. SS Error SS Hypot. MS Error MS F. Sig. F 
NTI 13.84 30.63 4.614 1.09 4.22 .014 
NTH 8.63 24.25 2.88 .87 3.32 .034 
NTIII 8.84 30.38 2.95 1.08 2.72 .064 
Post hoc analysis (Tukey HSD; P< .05) revealed that 
for Time I (Table 9), the only significant contrast was 
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between G2 and G3 showing that the 5-year-old children in 
the pretend play condition displayed a significantly 
higher mean narrative structure score than the 4-year-old 
children in the storytelling condition. The Q value 
obtained for this contrast was Q=4, 73, (4, 28 df) . 
Confidence intervals were computed using the Q distribu¬ 
tion for each of the possible contrasts. This table shows 
that only G2-G3 was different from zero. Since the 
confidence intervals for all other comparisons include 
zero; these differences are not different from zero, i.e., 
they are not significantly different. 
Table 9 
Post Hoc Tukey Confidence Intervals for Time I 
(Pairwise Group Comparison) 
Contrast Estimate Q Statistic 95% Confidence Intervals 
(Lower Upper) 
G1-G2 -1.25 -3.36 (-2.67 0.17) 
G1-G3 0.5 1.35 (-0.92 1.92) 
G1-G4 -0.625 -1.69 (-2.045 0.795) 
G2-G3 1.75 4.73 (0.33 3.17) 
G2-G4 0.625 1.69 (-0.795 2.045) 
G3-G4 -1.125 -3.04 (-2.545 0.295) 
At Time II, the post hoc analyses showed two mean 
significant contrasts. First, 5-year-old children in 
pretend play showed a significantly higher narrative 
structure than 4-year-old children in the storytelling 
condition. Also, again 4-year-old children in the pretend 
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play condition showed a higher level of narrative 
structure than 4-year-old children in the storytelling 
condition. This effect is displayed in Table 10. 
For Time II, confidence intervals were calculated 
using the Q distribution for each of the possible 
contrasts. The post hoc analyses showed that there 
Table 10 
Tukey Confidence Intervals for Time II 
(Pairwise Group Comparison) 
Contrast Estimate Q Statistic 95% Confidence 
(Lower 
Intervals 
Upper) 
G1-G2 -0.875 -2.65 (-2.145 0.395) 
G1-G3 0.375 1.14 (-0.895 1.65) 
G1-G4 -0.75 -2.27 (-2.02 0.52) 
G2-G3 1.25 3.79 (-0.02 2.52) 
G2-G4 0.125 0.38 (-1.145 1.395) 
G3-G4 -1.125 -3.41 (-2.395 0.145) 
was a single significant contrasts. The significant 
contrasts involved Groups 2 and 3. A Q statistic of 3.79 
was obtained for this contrast which approaches signi¬ 
ficance. The confidence intervals obtained were (-0.02, 
2.52) which barely includes zero. 
Finally, because the univariate analysis of narrative 
scores at Time III approached significance, we conducted a 
Tukey, post hoc analysis of these group scores, as well. 
Table 11 displays those results. None of the group 
differences reached significance. The differences between 
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Table 11 
Tukey Confidence Intervals for Time III 
(Pairwise Group Comparison) 
Contrast 
G1-G2 
G1-G3 
G1-G4 
G2-G3 
G2-G4 
G3-G4 
Estimate Q Statistic 95% Confidence Intervals 
(Lower Upper) 
-0.5 1.41 (-1.92 0.92) 
0.625 1.69 (-0.795 2.045) 
-0.75 
-0.53 (-2.17 0.67) 
1.125 0.79 (0.335 1.915) 
-0.25 -0.17 (-1.67 1.17) 
-1.375 -0.97 (-2.795 0.045) 
group 3 and group 4 and also groups 2 and 3 contributed to 
that near significant trend. That is, both the 5-year-old 
pretend play group (G2) and the 4-year-old pretend play 
group (G4) did better, (although not significantly so) 
than the 4-year-old storytelling group (G3). The 
confidence intervals confirm this non-significant trend. 
Table 12 presents the confidence intervals for time 
comparisons for each variable in each group. As expected, 
given the non-significant main effect for time, there were 
no sgnificant differences here. These are a small sample 
size of eight children each. Variability is high in each 
group, consequently, even the seeming decline in narrative 
structure scores for group 2, as seen in Figure 2, is not 
significant. 
In summary, with respect to narrative structure, 
there were clear and significant differences between 
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Table 12 
Multivariate Confidence Intervals for Narrative Structure 
(Variable Differences in Each Group) 
Contrast Estimate SE Confidence 
(Lower 
Intervals 
Upper) 
Decision 
Group 1 
NTI-NTII -0.125 1.155 
-3.561 3.311 No differ 
NTI-NTIII -0.125 1.313 
-4.031 3.781 No differ 
NTII-NTIII 0 1.58 
-4.696 4.696 No differ 
Group 2 
NTI-NTII 0.25 1.155 -3.186 3.686 No differ 
NTI-NTIII 0.625 1.313 -3.281 4.531 No differ 
NTII-NTIII 0.375 1.58 -4.325 5.075 No differ 
Group 3 
NTI-NTII -0.25 1.155 -3.686 3.186 No differ 
NTI-NTIII 0 1.313 -3.906 3.906 No differ 
NTII-NTIII 0.25 1.58 -4.45 4.95 No differ 
Group 4 
NTI-NTII -0.25 1.155 -3.686 3.186 No differ 
NTI-NTIII -0.25 1.313 -4.156 3.656 No differ 
NTII-NTIII 0 1.58 -4.7 4.7 No differ 
groups. The pretend play groups consistently score higher 
on narrative structure than the storytelling groups. 
These differences were significant at Times I and II, and 
approached significance at Time III. This was particu¬ 
larly true for the contrast of the 5-year-old pretend play 
group with the 4-year-old storytelling group. In contrast 
to "these group differences, there were no significant 
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differences in narrative structure scores between Times I, 
II and III. Each group's level of narrative structure 
appeared to remain remarkably constant over the three week 
test period. 
In the second MANOVA (Table 13), the dependent 
variable was the number of correct answers to the eight 
questions at Time I, Time II, and Time III. In this 
instance, the group variable did not achieve a significant 
multivariate F. However, there was a significant multi¬ 
variate effect in the time condition for the encoding and 
inference questions, F(3, 28)=9.013, pc.OOl. The 
univariate analysis of variance tests revealed that there 
Table 13 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance on Dependent 
Measures of Questions 
Hypothesis C M’ S M N F Sis. of F. 
Between Subjects 
Group [0 1] [1 1 1] 3 -1/2 12 1.13 0.353 
Within Subjects 
Time [1 0] [1 -1 0] 
[1 0-1] 1 0 12.1/2 9.013 0.001 
Between/Within 
GxT [1 0] [1 -1 0] 
[1 0-1] 2 0 12.1/2 0.574 0.749 
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Table 14 
Univariate F-tests with (3, 28) D.F. 
V ariable Hypoth.SS Error SS Hypoth.MS Error MS F. Sig. of F 
QTI 8.84 50.38 2.95 1.80 1.64 .203 
QTII 14.09 42.88 4.70 1.53 3.07 .044 
QTIII 9.25 42.25 3.08 1.51 2.04 .131 
was a significant effect at Time II, F(3, 28)=3.07, p<.044 
(Table 14) . The univariate Fs indicated that the only 
significant difference occurred at the Time II with 
pictures and dolls. This indicates that at Time II, the 
children did significantly better than at Time I and III. 
This is understandable because the children had the 
benefit of the learning experience at Time I. They also 
had the benefit of the stimulus materials at Time II that 
were not available at Time III. 
Post hoc analyses at Time II using Tukey's HSD<.05 
revealed that there was a near significant contrast 
between Group 1 and Group 3. The comparison of Group 1 
and Group 3 indicated that five-year-old children in the 
storytelling condition did significantly better than the 
four-year-old storytelling group. 
Confidence intervals were computed using the Q dis¬ 
tribution for each of the possible contrasts (Table 15) . 
This table shows that all contrasts included zero, i.e., 
the contrasts were not significantly different from zero. 
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Table 15 
Tukey Confidence Intervals for Time II of Questions 
(Pairwise Group Comparison) 
Contrast Estimate Q Statistic 95% Confidence Intervals 
G1-G2 -0.125 -0.28 (-1.815 1.57) 
G1-G3 1.375 3.125 (-0.32 3.07) 
G1-G4 1.125 2.56 (-0.57 2.82) 
G2-G3 1.5 3.41 (-0.19 3.19) 
G2-G4 1.25 2.84 (-0.44 2.94) 
G3-G4 -0.25 -0.57 (-1.94 1.44) 
Given the significant main effect of time, multi¬ 
variate confidence intervals were calculated to compare 
variable (time) differences for each group, but all 
contrasts included zero so that the contrasts were not 
different from zero, i.e., the contrasts were not signi¬ 
ficant from each other (Table 16). This finding may be 
due to the small sample size of each group, N=8. 
Comparison of Encoding and Inference Questions in 
Storytelling and Pretend Play 
The third MANOVA examined the effects of encoding and 
inferences (two types of questions) on storytelling and 
pretend play at each of three times. 
Four contrasts were defined for the 3 df associated 
with this nominal variable. The contrasts tested for 
average among six variables; (1) the main effects of Time; 
(2) the main effects of encoding and inference; (3) the 
interaction - time x type of question; (4) group x time; 
79 
Table 16 
Confidence Intervals for Questions 
(Variable Differences in Each Group) 
Contrast Estimate SE Confidence 
(Lower 
Intervals 
Upper) 
Decision 
Group 1 
QTI-QTII -1.125 1.048 -4.245 1.995 No differ 
QTI-QTIII -0.375 1.01 -3.375 2.625 No differ 
QTII-QTIII 0.75 0.665 -1.23 2.73 No differ 
Group 2 
QTI-QTII -0.625 1.048 -3.745 2.495 No differ 
QTI-QTIII -0.25 1.01 -3.25 2.75 No differ 
QTII-QTIII 0.375 0.665 -1.605 2.355 No differ 
Group 3 
QTI-QTII -0.5 1.048 -3.62 2.62 No differ 
QTI-QTIII -0.25 1.01 -3.25 2.75 No differ 
QTII-QTIII 0.25 0.665 -1.73 2.23 No differ 
Group 4 
QTI-QTII -0.5 1.048 -3.62 2.62 No differ 
QTI-QTIII -0.25 1.01 -3.25 2.75 No differ 
QTII-QTIII 0.25 0.665 -1.73 2.23 No differ 
(5) group x type of question; (6) group x time x type of 
question. 
The model appropriate for the dependent variable of 
this MANOVA design is Y=XB+E [Y:32x6, X:32x4, B:4x6, 
E:32x6] where: 
Y=[tlenc tlinf tllpen tllping tlllnpen tlllnif] 32x6 
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x= [1 1/2,1 1/2,1 1/4,1] 
[1 1/2,1 -1/2,1 - 1/2,1] 
[1 - 1/2,1 1/2,1 - 1/2,1] 
[1 - 1/2,1 -1/2,1 1/4,1] 
B= [ (u+t •)1 (u+t)2 (u+t.)3 (u+t. )4 (u+t.)5 (u+t.)6] [ (tl- t4) (tl-t4) (tl .-14) (t1-t4) (tl-t4) (t1-t4)] [ (t2 - t4) (t2-t4) (tl 
-14) (t2-t4) (t2-t4) (t2-t4)] [ (t3 - t4) (t3-t4) (t3 
-14) (t3-t4) (t3-t4) (t3-t4)] 
E= [ell el2 el3 el4 el5 el6] 
[e21 e22 e23 e24 e25 e26] 
[e31 e32 e33 e34 e35 e36] 
[e41 e42 e43 e44 e45 e46] 
[e51 e52 e53 e54 e55 e56] 
[e61 e62 e63 e64 e65 e66] 32x6 
To test hypothesis, it can be shown HO: CBM=0 
i) Independent variable: 
C= [100 0] Cl=Constant 
[0100] C2=Difference between groups 
[0 0 10] 
[0 0 0 1] 4x4 
ii) Dependent variables (Within Groups) 
M matrices i • 
Ml 7 : [1 1 
M2 ' : [1 - 1 
[1 0 
M3 ' : [1 1 
M4 ' : [1 - 1 
[1 0 
1 1 1 1] 
0 1 -1 0] 
1 1 0 
-1] 
1 -1 -1 
-1] 
0 -1 1 0] 
1 -1 0 1] 
HO: CBM=0 
HO: C1BM1=0; 
HO: C1BM2=0; 
HO: C1BM3=0; 
HO: C1BM4=0; 
HO: C2BM1=0; 
HO: C2BM2=0; 
HO: C2BM3=0; 
HO: C2BM4=0; 
Average of average 
Time main effects 
Encoding and Inference effects 
Interaction; time x encoding x inference 
Group 
Group x time effects 
Group x encoding x inference 
Group x time x encoding x inference 
Table 17 presents the group means for the encoding 
and the inference questions at Time I, Time II, and Time 
III. There appear to be consistent differences between 
the two types of questions, which persist across research 
condition and time. In each group at each time, there is 
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a higher mean score for encoding than for inference 
questions. 
Table 17 
Cell Means of Encoding and Inferences 
Deoendent Variable 
Group TIenc TIinf Tllpen Tllpinf THInpen THInif 
1 3.0 1.5 3.75 1.875 3.375 1.5 
2 3.125 2.0 3.5 2.125 3.375 2.0 
3 2.0 1.75 2.75 1.5 2.625 1.375 
4 2.62 1.375 3.125 1.375 3.0 1.25 
(Grand 
Mean)2.69 1.66 3.28 1.72 3.094 1.53 
Note: TIenc: Encoding at Time I 
TIinf: Inference at Time I 
Tllpen: Encoding with pictures and dolls at Time II 
Tllpinf: Inference with pictures and dolls at Time II 
THInpen: Encoding with no pictures and no dolls at Time III 
THInif: Inference with no pictures and no dolls at Time III 
Among four groups, group 2 (older children in pretend 
play group) resulted in higher means than the other three 
groups. However, the means of encoding and inferences 
were significantly different from each other. 
Further, an examination of Table 17 and Figure 3 
seems to indicate that older children scored better (more 
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right answers and fewer errors) than younger children on 
the total scores, that is, proportion of the questions 
correctly answered. Also, among the four groups of the 
children, the groups in the pretend play condition appear 
to be better than groups in the storytelling condition on 
encoding and inference questions. 
■5S-ST ■5S-PP ■4S-ST — X 4S-PP —X- ■ Grand 
Mean 
Figure 3. Sample.Profiles between Time I and Long-Term 
Retention for Encoding and Inferences 
Storytelling of 5-year-old children 
Pretend Play of 5-year-old children 
Storytelling of 4-year-old children 
Encoding at Time I 
Inference at Time I 
Tllpen: Encoding with pictures and dolls at Time II 
Tllpinf: Inference with pictures and dolls at Time II 
THInpen: Encoding without pictures & dolls at Time III 
THInif: Inference without pictures & dolls at Time III 
A third MANOVA (Table 18) was conducted to assess 
whether the four groups differed with respect to encoding 
versus inference questions across three different time 
30-0 1 
5S-PP 
4S-ST 
Tlienc 
TIinf 
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periods. As expected, (Figure 4) there was a clear 
significant difference for the two types of questions - 
encoding and inferences (F= 65.76, pc.OOl). There were no 
main effect for groups, or for time, nor were there any 
significant interactions. 
Table 18 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance on Six Sets of 
Dependent Measures of Encoding and Inferences 
Hypothesis C M' S M N F Sig. of F 
Between Subjects 
Group [0 1] [111111] 3 1 10,1/2 2.49 0.081 
Within Subjects 
Time [1 0] [1-10 1 -1 0] 
[10-1 1 0 -1] 1 0 12,1/2 2.49 0.125 
Enc. and Inf. [1 0] [1 1 1 -1 -1 -1] 
Time x Enc. and Inf. 
65.76 0.000 
[1 0] [1 -10-1 1 0] 
[1 0 -1 -1 0 1] 1 0 12,1/2 5.83 0.075 
Between/Within 
Groupx Time [1-10 1 -1 0] 
0.993 [10-1 1 0 -1] 2 0 12,1/2 0.31 
Group x Enc. and 
Inf. [111-1 -1 -1] 1.22 0.32 
Group x Time x [1-10-11 0] 
Enc. and Inf. [1 0 -1 -1 0 1] 2 0 12,1/2 0.56 0.647 
The youngsters in this study always did better at 
encoding than inferences. Table 18 and Figure 4 also show 
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that the differences due to encoding and inferences were 
extremely large, F(3, 28)=65.76, pc. 000. When this F 
value is compared to the other findings, it is evident 
that the effects of the cognitive variables of encoding/ 
inferences are large and imposing. It is interesting that 
there were no main effects due to group and time. 
Encoding Inference 
Figure 4. Sample Profiles for Encoding and Inferences 
An inspection of the univariate Fs indicataed that 
there was a significant group effect on the encoding 
questions at Time I, F(3, 29)=3.88, pc.02 (Table 19). 
This finding indicates that the group differences observed 
in Figure 3 were significant at Time I. This finding is 
not surprising because older children are often better 
than younger ones at the identification of content in the 
story. 
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Table 19 
Univariate F-tests with (3, 28) D.F. 
for Encoding and Inference 
Variable Hypoth. SS Error SS Hypoth. MS Error MS F. Sig. of F. 
TIenc 6.125 14.75 2.04167 0.53 3.88 0.02 
TIinf 1.84375 27.38 0.61458 0.98 0.63 0.603 
Tllpenc 4.59375 19.88 1.53125 0.71 2.16 0.115 
Tllpinf 2.84375 23.63 0.95 0.84 1.12 0.356 
THInpenc 3.09375 23.625 1.03 0.84 1.22 0.320 
THInpinf 2.59375 15.375 0.86 0.55 1.57 0.218 
Post hoc analyses (Tukey HSAD; P<.05) indicated that 
the following contrasts were significantly different from 
zero: Group 1 and Group 3 as well as Group 2 and Group 3. 
The significant difference between Group 1 and Group 3 
indicates that the 5-year-old storytelling group was 
significantly better at encoding than the 4-year-old 
storytelling group. The significant differences between 
Groups 2 and 3 indicates that the 5-year-old pretend play 
group did significantly better than the 4-year-old 
storytelling group on the encoding questions. In fact, 
confidence intervals (Tukey HSD; p<.05) indicated that 
there were two contrasts that had an obtained value that 
exceeded Q=3.85, d.f.=4. 28. Confidence intervals were 
also computed using the studentized (Q) distribution. 
This table (20) shows that at G2-G3 is different from 
zero. Since the confidence intervals fro all other 
comparisons include zero, these differences are not 
different from zero. Table 20 shows this result. 
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Table 20 
Tukey Confidence Intervals for Encoding at Time I 
(Pairwise Group Comparison) 
Contrast Estimate Q Statistic 95% Confidence Intervals 
(Lower Upper) 
G1-G2 -0.125 -0.48 (-1.126 0.876) 
G1-G3 1 3.85 (-0.001 2.001) 
G1-G4 0.38 1.46 (-0.621 1.381) 
G2-G3 1.125 4.81 (0.124 2.126) 
G2-G4 0.505 1.94 (-0.496 1.506) 
G3-G4 -0.62 -2.38 (-1.621 0.381) 
Finally, there were no significant differences 
between Time I, II or III on either the encoding or the 
inference questions. The means for encoding were always 
significantly larger than the means for inference 
questions. The apparent improvement in Figure 3, from 
Time I to Time II followed by a decrement from Time II to 
Time III was not significant. 
The Effects of Storytelling and Pretend Play on 
the Cognitive Processing of Narrative Recall 
The Linear Structural Relations (LISRREL VII) Program 
(Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989) was used to exaine the causal 
interdependency between the variables of interest in this 
analysis. Structural equation modeling is a comprehensive 
statistical approach for testing hypotheses about 
relationships among observed and latent variables. The 
fit of the model can be determined by examining the chi- 
square fit statistic. If this statistic is significant. 
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the model does not fit the data. For maximum likelihood, 
the X**2 (Square)-measure is (N-l) times the minimum value 
of the fit function for the specified model. The X**2- 
measure is distributed asymptotically as a chi-square 
distribution under certain conditions. The degrees of 
freedom for chi-square statistic are df = 1/2(p+q) 
(p+q+l)-t, where p+q is the number of observed variables 
analyzed and t is the total number of independent 
parameters eximated. "The X**2-measure is sensitive to 
sample size and very sensitive to departures from 
multivariate normality tend to increase X**2 over and 
above what can be expected due to specification error in 
the model" (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989). 
The covariance matrix was used to analyze this model 
in which the two variables were used simultaneously to 
predict measures of internalized point and externalized 
point. 
The structural equation models showing narration and 
pretend play with the questions of encoding and inferences 
effects for the analysis are depicted in Figure 5. The 
researcher extimated the hypothesized nature of the 
relationships among narrative structure, pretend play and 
cognitive porocessing questions. The likelihood ratio 
test statistic, chi-square with 7 degrees of freedom was 
17.69. The level of significance is P=.013, we can 
conclude that alpha=.01 level, the model does not fit the 
data. 
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Figure 5. A Structural Equation Modelling for the 
Relationship among Storytelling, Pretend 
Play and Cognitive Variables. 
Note: N= 32, Chi-Square with 7 df= 17.69, p=.013 
Goodness of Fit Index = .860 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index = .580 
Figure 5 presents the hypothetical model. In the 
model, storytelling and pretend play influenced the 
cognitive processing questions. Also, storytelling and 
pretend play were connected to the narrative structure and 
the questions. The theory was not supported with regard 
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to the effect of the storytelling and pretend play 
variables in discriminating between narrative recall and 
questions. It should also be noted that this analysis 
allowed the error terms for the narration and questions to 
control for informant variance. 
To summarize, storytelling and pretend play 
differentially affected two measures. Children in the 
pretend play condition performed significantly better than 
those in the storytelling condition on narrative structure 
of their retelling at Time I and II and better on encoding 
questions at Time I. 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Storytelling today is increasingly recognized as 
important with theoretical and practical implications. 
Storytelling is part of the emerging fields of discourse 
and narrative analysis. The fields of literature, 
comparative literature, literacy criticism, anthropology, 
psychology and education are turning to discourse and 
narrative analyses as important approaches to inquiry. In 
education, storytelling is increasingly being recognized 
as important. Storytelling reflects moral standards, 
life-styles, fantasy, humor, emotions and different ways 
of knowing. Early childhood educators are recognizing 
that storytelling and pretend play enable children to 
think about their futures as well as their present roles. 
Children's engagement in and understanding of 
pretense is a classic topic in developmental research 
(e.g., Piaget, 1962), and for good reason. Pretend play 
emerges regularly in normally developing children; it 
emerges early, typically around eighteen months of age, 
and then grows rapidly in complexity and frequency. A 
child is atypical indeed who does not spend many preschool 
hours engaged in pretense, sometimes alone, but most often 
with others. Like language acquisition, pretend play may 
be a universal, rapidly acquired human competence. But it 
is a peculiar and intriguing competence. In pretense, the 
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child treats nothing as something (an empty pot as full of 
water), treats one thing as something else (a block as a 
car or a house), and purposely uses misleading actions and 
events (an empty cup raised to the face of an inanimate 
doll as a baby being fed). Much of the story of early 
cognitive development concerns, appropriately enough, the 
child's increasing competence at understanding the world 
"correctly," for example, coming to understand what 
physical objects are really like, what words 
conventionally refer to, how other people actually behave. 
In pretense, the child gets the story wrong, not by 
mistake, but by meaningfully construing things otherwise. 
Intringuingly, "this ability is not the sober culmination 
of intellectual development but instead makes its 
appearance playfully and precociously at the very 
beginning of childhood" (Leslie, 1987, pg. 412) . 
Vygotsky (1967) placed great emphasis on the 
affective aspects of pretense. Imaginative play 
"originally arises from action" and from generalized 
"unsatisfied desires." Play teaches the child "to sever 
thought from object" and provides a means for developing 
abstract thought. 
Leslie (1987) argues that during an act of pretense 
the primary representation, this is a banana, is copied 
into another context, 'this is a banana.' This secondary 
representation is 'decoupled' from reality, and its 
reference, truth and existence relations are suspended; so 
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representational abuse is avoided. The opacity afforded 
by the decoupling of the secondary representation's input- 
output relations is supposed to allow the decoupled 
expression to be transformed without abusing the primary 
representation, as in 'this banana is a telephone.' 
Leslie also suggests that the decoupled expression will be 
a second-order, metarepresentational one, maintaining that 
it will be a representation of the primary representation. 
The most distinctive feature of pretend play is that 
it is a representational activity. When children pretend, 
they use physical or psychological means to represent the 
meaning of another entity. For instance, when a child 
announces herself to be a mother, she uses words and 
actions to represent the mother role. 
In order to pretend with other players, children must 
agree on the reference of pretense and the appropriate 
ways of executing such pretend reference (Wolf, 1984). 
For example, when two children in their joint play pretend 
to be mothers, they try to reach a consensus about what 
constitutes motherness and possibly also change their 
initial understanding of motherness to produce closer 
agreement. 
All these views have influenced recent empirical 
research on the early development of pretend play. 
Several excellent reviews of this work have appeared 
recently (Fein, 1981). Because of a general consensus on 
basic theoretical questions, effort has concentrated on 
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documenting certain sorts of behavior change. Researchers 
also have focused on the "cognitive, creative, and 
affective implications of pretend play" (Haight, 1994). 
In social pretend play, children create the Vygotskian 
zone of proximal development for the acquisition of 
different perspectives of knowledge (Verba, 1993). 
Narration is, by its very nature, a story-based 
activity that engages children in a personal reconstruc¬ 
tion of the text. Storytelling is also an opportunity for 
the children to engage in the verbal repetition of 
rehearsal of the text information. Story retelling should 
affect how much is learned and what is learned, that is, 
retelling positively affects both the quantity and quality 
of what is learned from context. 
The basic evolutionary and ecological point of 
internal representational must be to represent aspects of 
the world in an accurate, faithful, and literal way, 
insofar as this is possible for a given organism. Such a 
basic capacity for representation can be called a capacity 
for primary representation. Primary representation is 
thus defined in terms of its direct semantic relation with 
the world. Its being literal and "sober" in representing 
the world determines its usefulness relative to the needs 
of the organism. 
Perception of the world and the things in it are a 
major source of the infant's stored knowledge. Such 
encyclopedic knowledge also forms structures of primary 
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representation. Again, the design principle for these 
representations is that they represent situations 
seriously and literally. 
The emergence of pretense is not seen as a 
development in the understanding of objects and events as 
such, but rather as the beginnings of a capacity to under¬ 
stand cognition itself. It is an early symptom of the 
human mind's ability to characterize and manipulate its 
own attitudes to information. Pretending to oneself is 
thus a spcial case of the ability to understand pretense 
in others (someone else's attitude to information). 
A child may read a story, understand the words and 
sentences yet fail to grasp the situation and development 
of it. Story comprehension often calls for more than 
understanding statements in isolation; it usually involves 
a process of making connections between statements and 
sustaining that process as the story progresses. The need 
for this connection-making process arises because children 
do not make explicit everything they want to tell the 
story. 
Storytelling and pretend play provide a motivating 
context for literate behavior, as children communicate 
through narration to themselves in solitary play and to 
their peers in social play. Also, linguistic behaviors 
allow children to create and share imaginary worlds and 
participate in the beginning of narratives. Further, 
storytelling makes collaboration in play and with others 
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possible and facilitates the development of friendship so 
that narration in collaborative activities with others 
enhances the complexity of play by deepening, lengthening, 
and diversifying play forms. 
Thus, this study attempted to explore that the 
children who reenact stories (especially pretend play) 
over some time period increase their ability to play 
skillfully and their ability to comprehend; that is, 
involvement in the general construct of play facilitates 
story comprehension relative to other conditions such as 
storytelling and enactment. 
This study had four central purposes: first, to 
measure significant differences between storytelling and 
pretend play; second, to measure significant differences 
between short-term and long-term memory; third, to measure 
significant differences between encoding and inferences; 
fourth, to validate inter-relationships among story¬ 
telling, pretend play, cognitive variables (encoding and 
inferences) and short- and long-term narrative recall. In 
general, it was theorized that storytelling and pretend 
play interact with the cognitive variables of encoding and 
inferences that posed particular dimension for child 
development. 
In this study, with respect to storytelling and 
pretend play, the results supported the empirical findings 
that storytelling and pretend play facilitated narrative 
recall. This finding provides encouraging evidence for 
96 
the usefulness of greater specification in the study of 
narration and pretend play development. In particular, it 
is evident that patterns of narrative structure and 
pretense need to be studied not only in terms of basic 
cognitive development and social development, but also in 
terms of different types of perspective. In so doing, it 
is critical to consider carefully the specific domains of 
child development likely to be affected by the distinct 
varieties of developmental categories. It is apparent 
from these findings that pretend play facilitates social- 
cognitive development. 
There is increasing agreement among both researchers 
and educators that literate behaviors, particularly in 
pretend play and storytelling, are seen as precursors to a 
grasp of the concept of "story" or "narrative" and the 
necessary perspective taking this implies. Such under¬ 
standing emerges through play as together children talk 
and share their early attempts to cognitive behavior. 
Compatible with current theory, as predicted, the 
researcher found that narrative structure and cognitive 
aspects explained much of the variability in children's 
responses. Storytelling or narrating can also be under¬ 
stood as communicative acts that follow certain narrative 
conventions, namely, that one should organize the telling 
of events according to the rules of intentional action and 
causal-temporal sequencing. 
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As expected, our findings indicate that there are 
significant differences in the ways in which storytelling 
and petend play influence the complexity of narrative 
structure. The significant chi-square at the Time I 
condition, X = 16.574 which was significant at the .001 
level (Table 3) indicated that pretend play was 
significantly more influential than storytelling in 
facilitating the recall of complex narrative structure. 
At Time II, there was also a significant difference 
between storytelling and pretend play with regard to 
recall of complex narrative structure. In this condition, 
the pictures and dolls were available to the youngsters to 
support recall. The children in the pretend play 
condition who had dolls available did significantly better 
than the children in the storytelling condition who had 
only pictures to facilitate recall. In addition, the 
children in the pretend play group had stronger 
associations than those in the storytelling group. It is 
likely that doll condition was more effective than picture 
condition. 
It is important to recognize that pretend play seems 
to have a decisive effect in facilitating narrative 
recall. This finding has implications for education and 
the cognitive development of young children. 
The second MANOVA analysis was based on adding 
together the encoding and inferences. A MANOVA analysis 
was applied to this combined variables and indicated that 
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there were significant differences due to age. This 
finding is expected and not surprising. Older children 
are more skilled in remembering than younger children. 
This same analysis of questions indicated that there were 
also significant differences due to time. These 
significant differences were consistent over time and 
across conditions. 
An interesting relationship was found between 
narration at Time I and long-term retention. The children 
remembered their narratives better at Time II than at Time 
I, and their performance at Time III was approximately the 
same as at Time II. These data are consistent with the 
view that children have the abilities to represent 
narrative in long-term memory. The relative poor 
performance of the children on the inference questions 
indicate that the ability to narrate is not related to the 
ability to process inferences, in this brief experience. 
Of the other independent variables, cognitive 
development is probably accountable for an important 
portion of the variance. Our findings indicate that there 
are no differences between the storytelling group and the 
pretend play group for encoding and inference. However, 
there was a significant effect due to task. This 
significant difference indicated that there were signifi¬ 
cant differences across groups on encodiing and inference 
(Figure 4). This difference can be easily seen by simply 
glancing at the means for the groups (Table 17). It was 
99 
also found that there were significant differences between 
groups at Time I on the encoding task. Also, the findings 
of this study demonstrated that children across the four- 
and five-year-old age groups integrated play events and 
story enactment to structure storytelling. All children 
were able to create shared meaning spontaneously during 
pretense and story representation. 
Finally, this study supports the hypothesis that both 
storytelling and pretend play can influence cognitive 
variables. Some evidence of the complex role of story¬ 
telling and pretend play as estimates of cognitive 
development awaits further investigation, particularly as 
linked to children's emergent social and symbolic 
competence. 
In addition, the educational implications of this 
research are multifaceted. Narrative structure, pretend 
play and learning have a complex relationship. Social 
pretend play contexts provide unique opportunities for 
young children to become adept at communicating their 
ideas. In pretend play, young children acquire new words 
to convey meaning that is often beyond their existing 
repertoires (Clarke, 1983). Furthermore, because pretend 
play is representational, children learn how to use 
gestures and words to designate real events and/or persons 
(Pelligrini, 1991). For example, Wolf and Grollman (1982) 
suggested that children's ability to integrate play events 
into coherent shared themes is related to narrative 
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competence. The linguistic and cognitive skills involved 
in storytelling, story enactment, and comprehension are 
important predictors of children's later mastery of 
reading and writing (Galda and Pelligrini, 1985) . 
Further research is required to understand the 
hostile bias found in children's narrative competence with 
storytelling and pretend play. As the research here 
suggests, varied social pretend play experiences and 
narrative recall may enhance young children's developing 
linguistic, social, and cognitive skills. Future studies 
need to progress beyond examination of single independent 
variables as models for the effects of storytelling and 
pretend play on short-term and long-term narrative recall. 
CHAPTER 6 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study began as an effort to examine the 
influence between storytelling and pretend play upon 
narrative recall, encoding and inferences, short- and 
long-term memory. 
The data from this study show that pretend play is 
superior to storytelling in the recall of the narrative. 
Narrative recall lends itself more easily to pretend play 
than to storytelling. As the child acts out the various 
parts in pretend play, she becomes more fully immersed in 
the narrative. The development of narrative through 
pretend play brings together the physical and the mental 
activities of the child, and provides a more complex set 
of aids to the process of recall. The storytelling 
condition which relied upon pictures only did not provide 
the set of physical stimuli that could act as aids in the 
process of recall. These differences suggest that the 
process of acting in pretend play may be a critical 
dimension in the process of the development of narrative 
recall. 
Children's storytelling and pretend play emerge at 
the same time because children are immersed in an ongoing 
stream of symbolization. Storytelling and pretend play 
are vehicles that are central to the development of 
imagination, role playing, thinking and feeling. The 
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exact relationship of storytelling and pretend play are 
yet to be fully explicated. It is possible that pretend 
play may be a prerequisite to the development of story¬ 
telling, and necessary for the invention of stories. 
The term pretend play is used to dnote activities 
that involve the representation of other objects or 
characters. To pretend to be another person - or to 
pretend that a doll is some specific person - seems to 
involve representing the internal life of that person as 
well as the person's social circumstances. To play 
another character well, one must represent the world as 
that person represents it. The research literature has 
found significant positive correlations between frequency 
of dramatic play and such skills as perspective-taking, 
cooperatives, and social competence (Connolly and Doyle, 
1984) . 
Representation of the actions and mental states of 
others is at the core of perspective-taking. It may also 
be a component of cooperativeness and social competence as 
well. The ability to see the world through the eyes of 
another is a requisite skill in the development of 
cooperation. 
It is interesting to note that one might take the 
position that storytelling and pretend play serve as the 
training grounds for the development of other social 
skills. As noted previously, pretense always entails a 
mental representational component, and sometimes it is 
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also accompanied by an action component, and sometimes it 
is also accompanied by an action component. Imitating the 
actions of another is an earlier stage in the development 
of pretending. It is the acting component of imitation 
that is the foundation for the later development of 
pretense. Another way to think about this is to recognize 
the fact that mental representation arises out of the act 
of imitating. Acting seems to be at the founcation of 
mental development. 
One of the interesting outcomes of this study is the 
finding that the memories of the children were remarkably 
stable and consistent. Storytelling and pretend play were 
remarkably similar in being able to sustain and support 
the memories of children. The acts of pretending and 
storytelling, i.e., pictures and dolls were able to 
attract attention, stimulate interest, aid memory 
recognition and served as vehicles in the process of 
recall. The pictures and dolls could facilitate the 
construction of a functional mental model between short- 
and long-term memory. This mental model was more related 
to encoding of events than to the ability of the children 
to make inferences. 
With time and experience, children become aware of 
the mental activities of others. Children are immersed in 
a world that revolves around mental activities such as 
sadness, happiness, jealousy and fear. They see those 
around them acting out these mental states. They slowly 
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learn to construct these activities as they engage in 
pretend play. Mental representations emerge in children 
as they master the intricacies of pretend play. 
To summarize, a mature understanding of storytelling 
and pretend play reveal an initial sense of sequential 
organization in their mental representations of 
narratives. Sequencing is a necesary requisite to the 
formation of narratives. Both storytelling and pretending 
facilitate the learning of sequencing. Pretend play 
appears to be more effective in facilitating the recall of 
the narrative, i.e., facilitating the ability to draw 
conclusions from the sequence of events. 
The children's performance in the dolls and pictures 
condition provided evidence of representational skills in 
stimulating cognitive activities. It may be that the 
capacity to participate in as-if worlds is the important 
cognitive development in pretense and narration. This 
capacity is exercised early in pretend play, and in 
children's love of stories. Further, pretend play may be 
a zone of proximal development in the same sense as 
enjoying stories, it may free children to participate in 
other realities. 
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APPENDIX A 
PERMISSION LETTER 
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Sook-Yi, Kim 
Early Childhood Education 
Furcolo Hall 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Amherst, MA 01003 
June 30, 1995 
Dear Parents: 
I would like your permission for your son/daughter_ 
to participate in the research for my doctoral dissertation. My 
research project is entitled, "The Effects of Storytelling and 
Pretend Play on Cognitive Processes, Short- and Long-Term Narrative 
Recall." 
My research involves children who are read a story. After reading 
the story, one half of the children are asked to repeat the story. 
One half of the children will be asked to act out the sequence of 
events in the story using dolls. One week later both groups of 
children are asked to remember the story. It is my hypothesis that 
those who enact the story will remember the story better than those 
who simply had to repeat (remember) the story. 
This research is not going to put your son/daughter at risk in any 
way. I would like to assure you that your son/daughter will have the 
right to withdraw from part or all of the study at any time. Your 
son's/daughter's name and involvement in this research will be held 
in strict confidentiality. The data will be coded and names will not 
be used in the analysis and reporting of the data. Once the data re 
coded and the analysis has been completed, the names of the children 
will be deleted from the records completely. Each of the research 
sessions will be audiotaped. The results of the research will be 
included in my dissertation, and hopefully, published at a later 
date. 
Please be assured that your son/daughter will be free to withdraw 
from this study without prejudice. If you have any questions at any 
time you may reach me at 546-0285. 
Thank you for considering the possibility of permitting your son/ 
daughter to participate in this study. 
Researcher's Signature 
Parent's Signature 
APPENDIX B 
STORYTELLING TASK: "WHO'S IN RABBIT'S HOUSE?" 
(BY VERNA AARDEMA) 
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Long long ago a rabbit lived on a bluff overlooking a lake. A 
path went by her door and down the bank to the water. The animals of 
the forest used that path when they went to the lake to drink. 
Every day, at dusk. Rabbit sat in her doorway and watched them. 
But one evening she came to her house and she could not get in. 
And a big, bad voice from inside the house roared, "I am The 
Long One. I eat trees and trample on elephants. Go away! Or I will 
trample on you!" "That's my house!" cried Rabbit. "Come out at 
once!" She banged on the door, ban, ban, ban'. 
But the bad animal said more crossly than before, "Go away! Or 
I will trample you." And the rabbit sat down on a nearby log to 
think. 
Now a frog happened to see this. She hopped up to the rabbit 
and said rather timidly, "I think I could get him out." "Nuh!" 
sniffed the rabbit. "You are so small. You think you could do what 
I can not? You annoy me! Go away!" Frog would have left that rude 
rabbit if a jackal had not come along just then. 
Instead she crouched behind a nearby tree to see what would 
happen. 
The jackal said, "Ho, Rabbit, why aren't you sitting in your 
doorway?" "Someone's in my house," said the rabbit. "He won't come 
out. And I can't get in." 
A leopard came by. "What are you doing, Rabbit?" he asked. 
"Are you putting sticks there to hide your house?" Leopard watched 
as Rabbit removed the sticks. Then he asked, "Who's in Rabbit's 
house?" 
An elephant came by. "What happened. Rabbit?" she asked. 
"Does your roof leak?" "No, not that!" cried the rabbit. "Someone's 
in my house. Leopard wanted to tear it to bits and eat him. So I 
had to fix my roof." 
A rhinoceros came by. He asked, "What are you doing, Rabbit? 
Are you making a farm here by your house?" "Who's in Rabbit's 
house?" asked the rhinoceros. 
The frog came up from the lake. "Don't cry, Rabbit," she said. 
"I think I could get that bad animal out of your house - if you would 
let me try." "how?" asked the rabbit. Frog whispered, "Scare him 
out." Rabbit whispered back, "But how?" 
Frog said, "I am the spitting cobra! I can blind you with my 
poison! Now come out of that house, or I'll squeeze under the door 
and spit poison SSIH into your eyes!" Then hirrr the door opened. 
Out came a long green caterpillar. He was so scared, his legs 
were jumping vityo, vityo, vityo. He was looking everywhere - rim, 
rim, rim. "Where's the spitting cobra?" he cried. 
"It's only a caterpillar!" cried Rabbit. "Only a caterpillar," 
echoed Frog. She called the other animals. How they laughed when 
they saw that the bad animal was only a caterpillar. 
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APPENDIX C 
SCALES AND QUESTIONS FOR STORYTELLING AND PRETEND PLAY 
IN DATA COLLECTION 
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Kindergarten Group (Groups 1 and 2) 
Preschool Group (Groups 3 and 4) 
Date: 
Age: 
Name: 
Institution: 
Storytelling (Narrative Structure): 
1. Non-Response 
2. A short description 
3. A sequential narrative 
4. Plotted (all phases) 
Encoding: 1. Who was sitting in front of the house? 
2. Why couldn't the rabbit enter her house? 
3. Who wanted to help the rabbit at first? 
4. Who is in rabbit's house? 
Inference: 5. Why was the rabbit afraid to go into the house? 
6. How did the frog scare the caterpillar inside the 
house? 
7. What was the difference between the frog and the 
other animals? 
8. What did the jackal, leopard, elephant, and 
rhinoceros do that was the same in the story? 
Ill 
Kindergarten Group (Groups 1 and 2) 
Preschool Group (Groups 3 and 4) 
Date: 
Age: 
Name: 
Institution: 
Narrative Structure: 
Scale for Pretend Play: 
1. Introduces no pretend elements into the play situation. 
2. Is slightly pretend in his play? Occasionally introduce 
pretend elements into play situation. 
3. Shows a moderate amount of pretending in his play, but 
not original. Little organization of pretense or role- 
playing . 
4. Shows a substantial amount of pretend elements in his 
play, showing some originality in his pretending. Some 
organization and consistency in pretense or role- 
playing, including some stimulated vocalizations. 
5. A very high number of pretend elements in his play. 
High organization of activity and role-playing. 
Questions: 
Encoding: 1. Who was sitting in front of the house? 
2. Why couldn't the rabbit enter her house? 
3. Who wanted to help the rabbit at first? 
4. Who is in rabbit's house? 
Inference: 5. Why was the rabbit afraid to go into the house? 
6. How did the frog scare the caterpillar inside the 
house? 
7. What was the difference between the frog and the 
other animals? 
8. What did the jackal, leopard, elephant, and 
rhinoceros do that was the same in the story? 
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